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THE LIBERAL DISCOURSE AND THE
“NEW WARS” OF/ON CHILDREN
Noëlle Quénivet *
“We are urging all governments and armed groups to
end the military recruitment of children under 18 and to
release those children already in service. There can be
no excuse for arming children to fight adult wars.”1
Statement by Mary Robinson, United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Feb. 12, 2002
INTRODUCTION

T

he typical armed conflict of the last few decades has not
been one where instruments of high technology such as
unmanned drone and guided missiles has been used; rather, it
has been fought by young people with AK-47s2 and machetes.3
The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Uganda illustrate the extensive participation of children in hostilities. Since the early 1990s, after Graça Machel’s4

* Associate Professor and Head of the International Law and Human Rights
Unit at the University of the West of England (United Kingdom); Ph.D. 2004,
Essex; LL.M. 1998, Nottingham. The author is particularly grateful to Robert
P. Barnidge, Jr. and Shilan Shah-Davis for their valuable comments on various drafts of this paper and to the editors of the Journal for their outstanding
work in reviewing the article.
1. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, High Commissioner for Human Rights Welcomes Entry into Force of Instrument against Use of
Child Soldiers, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (Feb. 12, 2002),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=663
3&LangID=E.
2. In relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone, see AK-47: The Sierra Leone
and
Child
Soldier,
BBC
NEWS
(Dec.
6,
2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4500358.stm.
3. Harold Koh explains that “[j]ust as Rwanda was a ‘low-tech genocide,’
committed largely by machete, small arms constitute today’s real weapon of
mass destruction.” Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2338 (2003).
4. In 1993, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and
the General Assembly requested a report to be produced on the impact of
armed conflict on children. In 1994, United Nations Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali entrusted this task to Graça Machel, Mozambique’s
first post-independence Minister for Education.
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seminal report on the impact of armed conflict on children,5 a
coalition of non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and individual activists has strongly argued against the use of children, defined as individuals below eighteen years of age, in
armed conflict. A black African boy holding an AK-47 has become universally recognised as a symbol of child soldiering,6 a
situation viewed by many as intolerable. It has been argued
that a liberal society, which cherishes values such as universality of human rights, cannot possibly approve of children’s involvement in armed conflicts, since this is contrary to the values of the civilized world;7 “War Is Not Child’s Play”8 is one recent academic article that astutely reflects this view. This raises a number of questions. What distinguishes this African boy
from the French, canonized heroine Joan of Arc? Also, why is
the world’s attention focused on the plight of African children
when both the United Kingdom9 and the United States of
America continue to recruit children to join their armed forces?10 The way we look at children, more specifically children in
conflicts, has changed over time; thus, examining the issue of
child soldiering in a historical context appears expedient.
5. See Expert of U.N. Secretary-General, Impact of Armed Conflict on
Children, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) (by Graça Machel) [hereinafter
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children].
6. See Lindsay Stark, Neil Boothby & Alastair Ager, Children and
Fighting Forces: 10 Years on From Cape Town, 33 DISASTERS 522, 524 (2009).
7. See Lisa Hughes, Can International Law Protect Child Soldiers?, 12
PEACE REV. 399, 399 (2000).
8. See generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 57 (2006).
9. “The UK . . . remains among a group of fewer than 20 countries which
continue to permit in law the recruitment of children into the armed forces
from the age of 16 years. No other country in the European Union and no
other UN Security Council permanent member state recruits from this age.”
COAL. TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CATCH 16–22: RECRUITMENT AND
RETENTION OF MINORS IN THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES 8 (2011) [hereinafter
RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCES].
10. “The majority of recent scholarly research relating to children and
armed conflict has, quite rightly, been directed toward eliminating the use of
child soldiers by rebel groups in developing nations.” Stephen Brosha, Children as Tools of War: Seeking Global Solutions Through Theoretical Analysis,
2 ATLANTIC INT’L STUD. J. (2005), http://atlismta.org/online-journals/0506journal-government-and-the-rights-of-individuals/children-as-tools-of-war; see
also Jason Hart, The Politics of “Child Soldiers,” 13 BROWN J. WORLD AFF.
217, 221 (2006).
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Moreover, childhood is defined by social policymaking predicated on many factors, including “ideas of what children are or
normally should be.”11 This, in turn, involves analyzing the
subject matter from a socio-legal perspective.
Liberalism, which is based on the concept of human dignity
and universal human rights, conceives of children’s involvement in armed conflicts as a violation of their human rights.
Consequently, an international lobbying campaign,12 led by a
number of human rights and humanitarian NGOs as well as
the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), has
attempted to transform the moral value of disapproving children’s involvement in armed conflicts into a legal norm that
problematizes their involvement. The main achievements of
this campaign, favoring “[a] universal approach . . . perceiv[ing]
all under-18 recruitment into armed groups as offensive, from
under-18-year-olds enlisting in state armies with parental
permission to young teenagers joining an armed group in order
to defend their own social group to pre-teens abducted and desensitized to the act of killing,”13 have been the adoption of a
series of hard and soft law instruments such as the Optional
Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict,14 the creation of the
United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict,15 among others.16 This norm entrepreneurship17—of transforming moral
values into legal norms—has been such a success that it is
11. Allison James & Adrian L. James, Childhood: Toward a Theory of Continuity and Change, 575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 25, 32 (2001).
12. For a background on progression of the campaign, see generally Perinaz Kermani Mendez, Moving from Words to Action in the Modern ‘Era of
Application’: A New Approach to Realising Children’s Rights in Armed Conflicts, 15 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 219 (2007).
13. Mary-Jane Fox, Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork
Gains and Conceptual Debates, 7 HUM. RTS. REV. 27, 42 (2007).
14. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc.
A/54/RES/263 (Mar. 16, 2001) [herein after Optional Protocol].
15. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO SECRETARYFOR
CHILD.
&
ARMED
CONFLICT,
GENERAL
http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
16. For an overview of the new mechanisms, see R. Charli Carpenter, Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issues Emergence and Nonemergence in
Transnational Advocacy Networks, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 99, 105–12 (2007).
17. For a discussion on norm entrepreneurship, see id., at 113–14.
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commonplace to consider child soldiering as an enormity and
an affront to human dignity. Criticism against the opinion that
child soldiering is inacceptable as such has been raised at
times,18 but it has not been welcome. Nonetheless, the mainstream view that child soldiering is unacceptable not only fails
to consider it from a historical perspective19 but also is insufficiently sensitive to local and regional cultures and traditions.20
Additionally, liberals contend that law is “the best instrument for securing liberty, empowering humanity, and bringing
about social change.”21 Yet, the current legal framework does
not offer such a straight-forward position as three legal regimes apply in relation to child soldiers: the human rights law
regime that applies at any time (United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child22 and the Optional Protocol23), the international humanitarian law regime that only applies in times
of conflict of an international (Geneva Conventions24 and Addi-

18. See David M. Rosen, Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law,
and the Globalization of Childhood, 109 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 296, 296
(2007).
19. See Hart, supra note 10, at 219.
20. In the discrete context of child labor, Timothy Ivins refers to the “‘West
cultural arrogance’ [that] does not take into consideration local cultural
norms and needs.” Timothy Ivins, A Contextual Approach to Child Labour, 1
CROSS-SECTIONS: BRUCE HALL ACAD. J. 36, 38 (2005).
21. See Ah-Jung Lee, Understanding and Addressing the Phenomenon of
‘Child Soldiers’: The Gap Between the Global Humanitarian Discourse and
the Local Understandings and Experiences of Young People’s Military Recruitment 7 (Refugees Studies Ctr. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 52,
2009); see also BARBARA GOODWIN, USING POLITICAL IDEAS 40–41 (4th ed.
2005).
22. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov.
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCRC].
23. Optional Protocol, supra note 14.
24. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva
Convention), Aug, 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/380 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
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tional Protocol I25) or non-international nature (Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II26),
and international criminal law which relates to the prosecution
of individuals having committed crimes in times of armed conflict (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, also
known “Rome Statute”27).
Whilst it is true that human rights instruments condemn the
participation and use of children in armed conflict, since 1977
little, if any, progress has been made in international humanitarian law in actually tackling the issue of child soldiering. And
this is despite the work of ICRC and some humanitarian
NGOs. A key underlying question remains: why should child
soldiering between fifteen and eighteen years of age be universally banned?28
This Article aims to radically rethink the notion of child soldiering in human rights and international humanitarian law in
order to assess whether a change in the law is indeed necessary. With this view, it begins by exploring how and why the
phenomenon of child soldiering has gained prominence in recent years. It then examines the current legal framework—
including human rights law, international humanitarian law,
and international criminal law—in relation to the recruitment,
conscription, enlistment, and participation of children in armed
conflict. This Article ends by critically analyzing international
law in this area through the prism of two values that are essential to liberal thinkers: universality, the idea that liberal
values apply across cultures, and autonomy, the idea that each
individual is able to take decisions independently of third party
interference. The Article concludes that the issue of child soldiering is more difficult to grasp than the liberal thinkers present it and that “the zero under 18” campaign29 launched by
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
26. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
28. See Lee, supra note 21, at 8.
29. The idea behind the campaign is that no child under the age of eighteen should be allowed to be recruited or take part in the hostilities. This
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the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict30 is
unlikely to be successful because it fails to take into consideration the weight of history, politics, and culture. That being said,
the Article’s aim is certainly not to portray child soldering as a
positive experience or excuse human rights violations that such
children suffer once they have, even voluntarily, joined armed
forces or armed groups.
I. THE CHILD SOLDIER PHENOMENON
Undoubtedly, moral and societal values reflect the times we
live in. As Lisa McNee explains, the constructions of childhood
“are products of a particular period and a particular cultural
framework.”31 Until recently, the idea of children taking a direct and indirect part in armed conflicts was commonly accepted as an inevitable aspect of warfare. Yet, the rise of the human rights ideology and the emergence of the so-called “new
wars”32 have led child soldiering to be condemned.
A. Historical Approach to Childhood and Children in Wars
Social scientists contend that the concept of childhood did not
exist during the Middle Ages.33 The underlying belief was that
as soon as children’s abilities grew, so did their participation in
campaign is based on the fact that although the UNCRC states that a child is
anyone under the age of eighteen years old, this definition is repudiated in
Article 38 that allows for the recruitment and participation of children aged
fifteen and more. UNCRC, supra note 22, art. 38(3).
30. See Zero Under 18 Campaign, UNITED NATIONS OFF. SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE TO SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR CHILD. & ARMED CONFLICT,
http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/zero-under-18-campaign
(last visited Apr. 4, 2013). One of the campaign’s objectives is to “[e]ncourage
all States to raise the age of voluntary recruitment to a minimum of 18
years.” Id.
31. Lisa McNee, The Languages of Childhood: The Discursive Construction
of Childhood and Colonial Policy in French West Africa, 7 AFR. STUD. Q. 20,
20 (2004); see also Lee, supra note 21, at 4.
32. As Mary Kaldor summarizes, “the new wars involve a blurring of the
distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial
gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by
states or politically organized groups against individuals).” MARY KALDOR,
NEW & OLD WARS 2 (2d ed. 2007).
33. James & James, supra note 11, at 26. It must also be noted that a
child’s experience in medieval times highly depended on its social status.
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society expand. The idea that a person reached adulthood at a
certain fixed age simply did not exist at that time. One has to
wait until the late 1990s to see when a consensus began to
emerge, at least in regard to human rights law, which unequivocally declared that a child was anyone below eighteen years of
age.34 Furthermore, in medieval times young people “were not
granted any sort of special or distinctive social status.”35 By the
fifteenth century, however, an awareness developed to the effect that children should be afforded some special consideration, as their social experience and interaction was different
from that of adults.36 The first legal instrument to recognise
the specificity of “childhood” was the Geneva Declaration of the
Rights of the Child of 192437 followed by the more comprehensive Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted in 1959 by
the United Nations General Assembly38 and finally the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.39
Despite the acknowledgment that children’s role and place in
society was different, it remained common for them to partake
in armed conflicts. Examples include “the drummer boys in the
American Revolution,” “powder monkeys in the war of 1812,
the Mexican war, and the Civil War [of the United States],”
and the Hitler Youth during World War II.40 Closer to our time,
34. See UNCRC, supra note 22; see also Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labor art. 2, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.
35. James & James, supra note 11, at 26.
36. See id.
37. See Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Sept. 26, 1924,
League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 21, at 43. Article 25(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights also specifies that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (III) A, art. 25(s), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
38. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N.
GAOR, 14th Sess. Supp. No. 16 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Vol. I), at 19 (Nov.
20, 1959). As Joel Bakan asserts, “[b]y the middle of the [twentieth] century,
childhood was a robustly protected legal category.” Joel Bakan, The Kids Are
Not
All
Right,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
21,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/opinion/corporate-interests-threatenchildrens-welfare.html.
39. UNCRC, supra note 22.
40. Kristin Gallagher, Towards a Gender-Inclusive Definition of Child
Soldiers: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga,7 EYES ON ICC 115, 115 (2010–
11). Twelve year old boys were recruited by Robert Baden Powell during the
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during the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian president Rafsanjani declared that children as young as twelve should be fighting.41
Just as is the case today, military apprenticeship or military
service was an attractive vocation, especially where a formal
universal education system did not exist.42 In 1999 the Council
of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement stated that it was “seriously alarmed by the increasing number of children involved in armed conflict and by the
tremendous suffering endured by those children . . . .”43 Three
years earlier, in 1996, Machel had published her report exposing the plight of children in armed conflicts.44 As Ah-Jung Lee
aptly summarizes, “the global discourse is that children have
no place in war under any circumstance . . . .”45 Despite this
growing consensus, no one has yet actually addressed the loaded question of why child soldiering, defined for the working
purposes of this Article as an individual below the age of eighteen who takes a direct or indirect part in hostilities, is so widely and flatly condemned. To answer this question, one must investigate two key developments that have occurred in recent
decades that have radically changed mainstream perceptions of
child soldiering, namely the growing impact of liberal human
rights ideology and the emergence of “new wars.”
B. Human Rights Ideology
One key development in recent decades has been the growing
impact of a human rights ideology that finds its foundations in
liberal thought. Liberalism is committed to a society in which
individuals can freely and autonomously pursue and realize
their interests.46 Because liberals tend to view the individual as
“inviolable” and human life as “sacrosanct,” violence is prohibsiege of Mafeking in 1900 to deliver messages under fire. Michael Bartlet,
GUARDIAN,
Mar.
11,
2011,
Britain’s
Child
Soldiers,
THE
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/11/britain-child-soldiersarmy; see also Ilona Topa, Prohibition of Child Soldiering—International Legislation and Prosecution of Perpetrators, 3 HANSE L. REV. 105, 106 (2007).
41. See Gallagher, supra note 40, at 115–16.
42. Mary Jonasen, Child Soldiers in Chad, 10 INTERSECTIONS 309, 311
(2009).
43. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Children Affected by Armed Conflict, Council of Delegates Res. No. 8, pmbl. (Oct. 29–30, 1999).
44. See generally Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, supra note 5.
45. Lee, supra note 21, at 3.
46. See GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 37.
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ited barring the rare cases in which the liberal society is
threatened.47 For liberals, individual human rights, such as
those enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (e.g., right to life, freedom from torture, freedom of
speech),48 are fundamental in any given society. The advent of
a human rights ideology that began with the adoption of the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a range of
universal and regional human rights treaties has solidified the
liberal position in law.
As a result of liberalism’s “rights-based approach,”49 issues
relating to children have been entirely perceived through the
prism of human rights. In fact, the first comprehensive report
on the plight of children in armed conflict50 was based on a
human rights law framework: the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”).51 The seminal
work of Machel led to a discourse on which “child soldiering is
an unambiguous violation of universal children’s rights.”52 The
plight of children in armed conflict is viewed as child abuse and
a violation of human rights law.53 Remarkably, “[o]ver the past
20 years, human rights law involving the rights and welfare of
children has become increasingly focused on children participating in armed conflict.”54 That being said, it must be stressed
that in an armed conflict a different body of law, namely international humanitarian law, acts as the law governing the specific subject matter of children in armed conflict.55 As a result,
47. Id.
48. See UDHR, supra note 37, pmbl., art. 3, 5.
49. Lee, supra note 21, at 6 (noting that the “rights-based approach” refers
to “humanitarian agencies conceptuali[zing] ‘child soldering’ in terms of a
clear violation of universal children’s rights and a breach of international
humanitarian law”).
50. Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, supra note 5.
51. RACHEL HARVEY, CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT: A GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 14 (2003).
52. Lee, supra note 21, at 3.
53. See Vanessa Pupavac, Misanthropy Without Borders: The International
Children’s Rights Regime, 25 DISASTERS 95, 107 (2001).
54. Janet McKnight, Child Soldiers in Africa: A Global Approach to Human Rights Protection, Enforcement and Post-Conflict Reintegration, 18 AFR.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 113, 117 (2010).
55. Principle of lex specialis means that a law governing a specific subject
matter (e.g., international humanitarian law) overrides a law which only governs general matters (e.g., human rights law). For a discussion on the concept
of lex specialis, see generally Conor McCarthy, Legal Conclusion or Interpre-

1062

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

children are protected via human rights and humanitarian
law56 and attention should also be paid to international humanitarian law provisions.
C. Emergence of New Wars
A second key development in recent decades that has radically changed mainstream perceptions of child soldiering has been
the emergence and subsequent proliferation of so-called “new
wars.” A link can arguably be drawn between such wars and
the proliferation of the recruitment and use of children in combat.57 These wars stand in stark contrast to contemporary international armed conflicts or previous wars of national liberation.
Three salient features of these “new wars” contribute to the
increased involvement of children in them. Firstly, modern
warfare “is an especially aberrant and horrific phenomenon”58
as such conflicts are typically characterized by the abandonment of all moral standards and the “lack of a clear delineation
between war and peace . . . .”59 Distinctions between fighters
and civilians are generally not made,60 and worse still, the civilian population becomes the target of systematic attacks carried out with extreme levels of brutality and violence (e.g., use

tative Process? Lex Specialis and the Applicability of International Human
Rights Standards, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (Roberta Arnold &
Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008).
56. See HARVEY, supra note 51, at 6–7.
57. “The Special Representative is of the view that the risk or likelihood of
the realization of the crimes of conscripting or enlisting children under the
age of 15 years into the national armed forces, is inevitably high due to the
nature of some contemporary armed conflicts.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Written Submissions of the United Nations Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 6
(Mar. 18, 2008); see also Topa, supra note 40, at 105.
58. Rosen, supra note 18, at 298.
59. Gallagher, supra note 40, at 116.
60. HARVEY, supra note 51, at 5; see also Amy Beth Abbott, Child Soldiers—The Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 499, 509 (2000); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Statement of Witness Elisabeth Schauer, at 6 (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf.
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of systematic rape, torture, ethnic cleansing,61 abductions,
etc.).62 In such conflicts “opposing sides do not distinguish between children and adults,”63 for they are all part of the same
communities. In fact, due to the nature and pattern of this type
of warfare,64 an increasing number of children have become the
primary targets of armed forces and opposition groups who abduct or forcefully recruit them into the military factions.65 As
David Rosen argues, modern war is contemplated as an adult
enterprise that exploits inherently “vulnerable, weak, and irrational children.”66 Children are deemed to be a ready and expandable commodity.67 Mary Jonasen also notes that “[a]s the
number of available men to fight decreases, so does the age of
potential recruits, from youth to younger and younger children.”68 The objectification of children is illustrated by the fact
that boys are sent to the front and, if killed, simply replaced by
other boys.69 Children are also regarded by military leaders as
fearless,70 “cheaper to maintain within the ranks,”71 and “less
61. “The most common objective in [intrastate conflicts or internal power
struggles in developing countries] is persecution, expulsion and the extermination of an ethnic group.” Jonasen, supra note 42, at 314.
62. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Statement of
Witness Elisabeth Schauer, at 9–10 (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf.
63. Joseph N. Madubuike-Ekwe, The International Legal Standards
Adopted to Stop the Participation of Children in Armed Conflicts, 11 ANN.
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 30 (2005).
64. Michael Klaus, Kinder und Krieg—eine Bestandsaufnahme [Children
in War—A Survey], in FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG & UNICEF, Konferenz:
Kinder im Krieg [Conference: Children in War] 9, 12 (Aug. 25, 1999), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/01374.pdf.
65. See P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 5 (2005); Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Statement of Witness Elisabeth Schauer, at 41
(Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf.
66. Rosen, supra note 18, at 298; see also David Rosen, Social Change and
the Legal Construction of Child Soldier Recruitment in the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 2 CHILDHOOD AFR. 48, 49 (2010) [hereinafter Child Solder Recruitment].
67. Jonasen, supra note 42, at 315.
68. Ann Davison, Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Incident, 12
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 124, 137–38 (2004).
69. Human Rights Watch, How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in
Liberia,
1,
21
(Feb.
2,
2004),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/liberia0204.pdf.
70. Daya Somasundaram, Child Soldiers: Understanding the Context, 324
BRIT. MED. J. 1268, 1270 (2002).
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demanding and easier to manipulate than adult soldiers.”72
Children, who are known to be unaware of concepts such as
mercy and sympathy until a later age,73 are often used to terrorize the population, thus increasing the overall level of violence and contributing to and reinforcing the cycle of violence.
A second salient feature of the “new wars” that has contributed to the increasing involvement of children in them is that,
since these conflicts tend to occur in poor countries, they are
typically fought with light weapons that are cheap to buy. The
increased accessibility of small arms74 since the end of the Cold
War and the decreased difficulty in using such weapons due to
technological improvements75 have led to a higher number of
children taking a direct part in hostilities.76 The conflict in Sierra Leone is a sad testimony to the institutionalized nature of
conscription and use of children by armed opposition groups.77

71. Gallagher, supra note 40, at 117.
72. Bhavani Fonseka, The Protection of Child Soldiers in International
Law, 2 ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L. 69, 69–70 (2001).
73. See Jo Boyden, Children’s Experience of Conflict Related Emergencies:
Some Implications for Relief Policy and Practice, 18 DISASTERS 254, 260
(1994); see also Gus Waschefort, Justice for Child Soldiers? The RUF Trial of
the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 1 INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. 189, 189
(2010).
74. Koh defines “small arms and light weapons” as weapons that can be
carried by an ordinary person, that are “capable of delivering lethal force”
and that are “primarily designed for military use.” Koh, supra note 3, at
2334; see also David Southall, Armed Conflict Women and Girls Who Are
Pregnant, Infants and Children; A Neglected Public Health Challenge. What
Can Health Professionals Do?, 87 EARLY HUM. DEV. 735, 739 (2011).
75. Davison, supra note 68, at 138; see also Carol B. Thompson, Beyond
Civil Society: Child Soldiers as Citizens in Mozambique, 80 REV. AFR. POL.
ECON. 191, 191 (1999); Anatole Ayissi & Catherine Maia, La lutte contre le
drame des enfants soldats ou le Conseil de Sécurité contre le terrorisme à venir
[The Struggle Against the Tragedy of Child Soldiers, or the Security Council
Against Coming Terrorism], 58 REV. TRIM. DR. H. 341, 345–46 (2004) (Fr.);
William P. Murphy, Military Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientalism
in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean Civil Wars, 46 AFR. STUD. REV. 61, 74
(2003).
76. SINGER, supra note 65, at 45–49; HARVEY, supra note 51, at 66; Koh,
supra note 3, at 2335; Meredith Turshen, Women’s War Stories, in WHAT
WOMEN DO IN WARTIME: GENDER AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA 1, 7 (Meredith
Turshen & Clotilde Twagiramariya eds., 1998).
77. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 1603
(May 18, 2012).
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This has led to a corresponding increase in the “victimization of
women and children” alike.78
Thirdly, a wide range of actors—national liberation movements, insurgents, partisans, rebels, local militia, terrorist
groups, corporations, and others—are involved in the “new
wars,” and in practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between these factions and understand their interrelationships.
For example, an armed opposition group may use a local militia
to “recruit” individuals to work in mines. The harvested natural resources are then sold to a corporation and the money received from the proceeds of the resources is used to buy weapons from a terrorist group. In this environment, children are an
ideal weapon of war. Due to their young age, they “can . . . act
relatively inconspicuously in war zones, observing troop deployments, dispositions of weapons and noting logistical arrangements without attracting undue attention.”79 As children
are usually not suspected of being part of the hostilities, they
are neither monitored nor stopped and searched whilst there
are on duty. They are therefore an undeniable asset for these
armed opposition groups, notably because they can provide information on enemies’ movements and activities and also work
as a communication bridge for the groups.
Whilst liberal states such as the United Kingdom recruit
children into their own armed forces80 and sometimes let them
participate in conflicts (e.g., Iraq81), they decry the use of children in the “new wars”. Three main reasons can be adduced to
elucidate this seemingly contradictory view and why the inter78. HARVEY, supra note 51, at 60.
79. Frank Faulkner, Kindergarten Killers: Morality, Murder and the Child
Soldier Problem, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 491, 494 (2001).
80. For the United Kingdom’s viewpoint on its recruitment process, see
JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: ARMED FORCES
BILL, 2010–12, H.L. 145, H.C. 1037, ¶ 1.50 [hereinafter, ARMED FORCES BILL,
2010–12]; see also Bartlet, supra note 40.
81. For example, between 2003 and July 2005, fifteen soldiers below the
age of eighteen years old were deployed to Iraq. RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN
BRITISH ARMED FORCES, supra note 9, at 5. Five underage soldiers were also
deployed between 2007 and 2010. UK Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L ¶ 16 (Nov. 2011), http://www.childsoldidiers.org/user_uploads/pdf/unitedkingdomsubmissiontoununiversalperiodicrevi
ew13thsession2012771268.pdf [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L].
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national campaign against child soldiering has focused on conflicts waged in non-liberal states. First, there is the acknowledgment that the “new wars” have fostered a culture of using
and encouraging children to commit unspeakable acts of violence. International humanitarian law is systematically violated, and war crimes are chronically perpetrated by all parties to
the conflict.82 However, liberal states tend to take a range of
precautions to avoid such violations or at least lessen the occurrence of them, all the while being involved in conflicts.83
Second, liberal states recognize that child soldiers, who are in
large supply, both perpetuate the cycle of violence and lead to
the escalation, prolongation, and geographical expansion of the
conflict. Contemporary warfare as carried out by liberal states
tends to adopt strategies that allow such conflicts to be geographically and temporally controlled,84 and also uses technologies that require high levels of skills, thus providing no particular incentive for them to use children. Finally and most importantly, the overwhelming majority of children entangled in
such conflicts have not chosen a military path voluntarily. This
tends to differ from the experience of such liberal states as the
United Kingdom, where children appear to willingly opt for a
career in the armed forces or had responded to a historical call
in World War I.85 These three main reasons explain why the
focus of the international campaign against child soldiering has
been on conflicts waged in non-liberal states.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELATING TO CHILD SOLDIERING
In order to understand the current movement towards banning child soldiering one must first examine the current legal
framework in relation to recruitment, conscription, enlistment,
and participation of children in armed conflict. International
humanitarian law does not outlaw the recruitment and use of
children between fifteen and eighteen years of age in armed
conflict. Yet the ICRC, the guardian of the international humanitarian law treaties, contends that, “[d]espite the rules laid
down by international law, thousands of children are today tak82. For examples, see conflicts in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
83. See generally A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 IRRC 165
(2000).
84. For examples, see the conflicts in Kosovo and in Libya.
85. Lee, supra note 21, at 3.
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ing an active part in and are victims of hostilities.”86 In fact, it
is human rights law that is at the forefront of the campaign
against child soldiering. Therefore, although this Article examines these key issues by mostly concentrating on international
humanitarian law, it also looks at international human rights
law and, at times, international criminal law to provide a better understanding of the child soldier phenomenon.
Two key issues need to be addressed when examining the legal framework that relates to child soldiering and the liberal
discourse: the recruitment (conscription and enlistment) of
children and the participation and use of them in armed conflict.87 Whilst recruitment relates to the manner in which a
child becomes associated with an armed group, the use relates
to the way in which he/she participates in the conflict.88
A. Recruitment of Child Soldiers
1. Definition of Recruitment
Children are recruited into armed forces and armed opposition groups in various ways; some are abducted, some are forcibly recruited, and others join voluntarily. International humanitarian law—Article 77 of Additional Protocol I,89 Article
4(3) of Additional Protocol II,90 and Rule 136 of ICRC’s Study
on Customary International Humanitarian Law91—groups

86. ICRC, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, Guiding
Principles for the Domestic Implementation of a Comprehensive System of
Protection for Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, 11
(Sept.
15,
2011),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/ara/assets/files/2011/guiding-principles-children-icrc.pdf
[hereinafter Guiding Principles].
87. It must be stressed that “the three alternatives (viz. conscription, enlistment and use) are separate offences.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 609 (March 14, 2012), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf; see also Alison Smith, Child Recruitment
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1141, 1147–48
(2004).
88. Sandesh Sivakumaran, War Crimes Before the Special Court for Sierra
Leone: Child Soldiers, Hostages, Peacekeepers and Collective Punishments, 8
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1009, 1012 (2010).
89. Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 77.
90. Additional Protocol II, supra note 26, art. 4(3).
91. See 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 482–85 (2006), available at
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these different ways in which children join the armed forces or
an armed group involved in hostilities under the single term
“recruitment.” It also useful to remember that the term “recruitment” predates “enlistment” and “conscription,”92 two concepts that are now covered by “recruitment.”93
As the Commentary to Article 77 Additional Protocol I explains, whilst the obligation to refrain from recruiting children
under fifteen is clear, the voluntary enrollment of children is
neither explicitly mentioned nor prohibited.94 As there is no
express prohibition of the voluntary enrollment of children under fifteen years of age, it seems to indicate that voluntary enlistment is allowed by law. In other words, international humanitarian law distinguishes between two forms of recruitment, active recruitment by the armed forces (known as conscription) and voluntary enrollment, but only bans the former
in international armed conflict. By contrast, the Commentary
to Article 4(3) Additional Protocol II stipulates that “[t]he principle of non-recruitment also prohibits accepting voluntary enlistment.”95 Rule 136 of the Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law does not elaborate on this, though it does
refer to the Rome Statute96 which distinguishes between two
forms of recruitment: conscription and enlistment of children
under fifteen years of age.97 A further distinction is hereby introduced inasmuch as enlistment can be either compulsory or
voluntary depending on which legal instrument is used. Yet, as
the Commentary to the Rome Statute clarifies, “[c]onscription
refers to the compulsory entry into the armed forces. Enlistment . . . refers to the generally voluntary act of joining armed
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-internationalhumanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf.
92. Waschefort, supra note 73, at 196.
93. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 607
(March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf; Prosecutor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 184 (Mar. 2,
2009),
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215.
94. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 3184 (Yves
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
95. Id. ¶ 4557.
96. Rome Statute, supra note 27.
97. See id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii) (addressing both international
armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts).
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forces by enrollment, typically on the ‘list’ of a military body or
by engagement indicating membership and incorporation in the
forces.”98 A similar position was recently adopted by the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Lubanga case99 and the Special Court of Sierra Leone in
the Prosecutor v. Taylor case.100 Again, a difference is made between compulsory and voluntary acts. It must also be stressed
that the Rome Statute applies not only to armed forces but also
to armed opposition groups.101
Yet, the distinction between voluntary and compulsory recruitment fails to account for abductions, which are one of the
chief means used—especially by armed opposition groups—to
recruit children.102 Indeed, in the past few decades, abduction
and kidnapping have become the main ways to forcefully include children in armed groups.103 In some countries, abduction
of children has reached a level of automaticity. For example,
during the second part of the 1980s, Resistência Nacional
98. KAI AMBOS ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVER’S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 261
(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008); see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 246 (Jan. 29,
1997), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf. In the AFRC trial, the
Trial Chamber commented that “the only method described in the evidence is
abduction . . . .” Prosecutor v. Brima (AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T,
Judgment,
¶
1276
(June
20,
2007),
http://www.scsl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/TrialChamberJ
udgment/tabid/173/Default.aspx.
99. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 608
(March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
100. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 442 (May
18, 2012).
101. Article 1 of the Rome Statute stipulates that it has “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons” and thus does not distinguish between
members of armed forces or members of armed opposition groups. Rome
Statute, supra note 27, art. 1. In contrast, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict (“Optional Protocol”) differentiates between state actors and nonstate actors in this regard, and specifically recognizes the duties of non-state
armed groups. Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 4(1).
102. “Most armed groups recruit children by force.” Madubuike-Ekwe, supra note 63, at 33; see also Prosecutor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL04-15-T,
Judgment,
¶
1616
(Mar.
2,
2009),
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215.
103. See Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 63/241, ¶¶ 29, 51, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/63/241 (Mar. 13, 2009).
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Moçambicana (“RENAMO”) systematically abducted children
and forced them to participate in activities against the government of Mozambique.104 A method commonly used to forcefully recruit children is press-ganging, “where armed militia
groups . . . roam the streets and public gathering places, including school gates, to round up individuals they come across.”105
Such groups also raid schools and orphanages. A notorious example is a 1996 event where the Lord’s Resistance Army
(“LRA”) captured 136 girls from St. Mary’s College, an Aboke
school in Northern Uganda.106 Similarly, in 2001, armed groups
in Burundi abducted 300 children from schools and forced them
to carry military equipment or help wounded soldiers.107
With this view, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, whose
statute refers to two types of recruitment,108 has interpreted
“conscription” to include “acts of coercion, such as abductions
and forced recruitment,” for the purpose of using children in
hostilities.109 Undoubtedly, this “definition of conscription reflects its recognition of the changed nature of modern warfare.”110 The Special Court also explained that enlistment
means “accepting and enrolling individuals when they volun104. Jean-Claude Legrand & Fabrice Weissman, Les enfants soldats et usages de la violence au Mozambique [Child Soldiers and the Function of Violence in Mozambique], 18 CULTURES & CONFLICTS 2 (1995) (Fr.).
105. Madubuike-Ekwe, supra note 63, at 33; see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Witness Testimony DRC-OTP-WWW-0046, at 18
(July 9, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc713215.pdf.
106. See generally ELS DE TEMMERMAN, ABOKE GIRLS: CHILDREN ABDUCTED
IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2d ed. 2001).
107. MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION
41 (2006).
108. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 4, Jan. 16, 2002,
available
at
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&.
109. Prosecutor v. Brima (AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Judgment,
¶
734
(June
20,
2007),
http://www.scsl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/TrialChamberJ
udgment/tabid/173/Default.aspx.
110. Referring to the judgment of the AFRC Case: “While previously wars
were primarily between well-established States, contemporaneous armed
conflicts typically involve armed factions which may not be associated with,
or acting on behalf, a State. To give the protection against crimes relating to
child soldiers its intended effect, it is justified not to restrict ‘conscription’ to
the prerogative of States and their legitimate Governments, as international
humanitarian law is not grounded on formalistic postulations.” AFRC Case,
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, ¶ 734.
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teer to join an armed force or group;”111 in other words, enlistment does not involve an actual list of new recruits but also
“children enrolled by more informal means.”112 What it also
means is that whilst conscription is compulsory, enlistment
remains a voluntary act.
International human rights law instruments impose restrictions upon states related to recruitment in general. Article
38 of the UNCRC affirms that “State Parties shall refrain from
recruiting any person who was not attained the age of fifteen
years into their armed forces.” The prohibition on recruitment
of children under fifteen years of age is applicable both in
peacetime and in times of armed conflict, thereby leaving aside
the difficult question of qualification of the conflict. Moreover,
it does not distinguish between compulsory and voluntary recruitment.113 Yet, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict (“Optional Protocol”) does make this distinction,114 thereby espousing a perspective similar to the one propounded in international humanitarian law and leaving open
the definition of “voluntary.”115
2. How Voluntary Is “Voluntary”?
It is imperative to determine what makes an enlistment “voluntary,” since this is the distinguishing factor between conscription and enlistment116 not only in international humanitarian and human rights law117 but also between lawful and
111. Id. ¶ 735; see also Prosecutor v. Fofana (CDF Case), Case No. SCSL-0414-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 140 (May 28, 2008), http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9xsCbIVrMlY%3d&tabid=194.
112. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Written Submissions of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 9 (Mar. 18, 2008).
113. During the negotiations, such distinction was made but later abandoned. Claire Breen, When Is a Child Not a Child? Child Soldiers in International Law, 8 HUM. RTS. REV. 71, 83 (2007).
114. Article 3 of the Optional Protocol refers to voluntary recruitment. Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3.
115. See id. at 89; Breen, supra note 113, at 83.
116. See Alice Schmidt, Volunteer Child Soldiers as Reality: A Development
Issue for Africa, 2 NEW SCH. ECON. REV. 49, 56 (2007).
117. However, it must be borne in mind that the Rome Statute does not
refer to the degree of voluntariness in joining the armed groups. Thus, Alison
Smith notes that “the forcible or voluntary nature of the recruitment is not
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unlawful recruitment under international humanitarian law. It
is argued that the level of voluntariness can be assessed by examining two factors: whether a child appreciates the consequences of his/her decision and whether there are viable alternatives to joining the armed forces or groups.
In Western states, a minor must make a willing and informed
decision with the consent of his or her parents or guardians.118
A range of safeguards exist to ensure that this is an informed
choice119 by the child.120 This is congruent with state obligations under the Optional Protocol that stipulates that states
are required to ensure that voluntary recruitment is genuine
and not coerced (i.e., the informed consent of the recruits’ parents or legal guardians has been obtained and the recruits are
well informed about the duties involved in the military service).121 In reality, in the United Kingdom, a fair number of
young recruits come from the “least educated backgrounds”122
and are visited by army recruiters in economically deprived areas where these recruits reside.123 This certainly raises concerns as to the voluntariness of young people to join the armed

an element of the crime.” Smith, supra note 87, at 1148. In other words, there
is no defense to recruitment of children under the age of fifteen. See id.
118. See Armed Forces Act, 2006, c. 52, § 328(2)(c) (U.K.).
119. Elisabeth Schauer argues that a child, and even someone under twenty
years of age, is not able to give informed consent to joining military. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Statement of Witness Elisabeth
Schauer,
at
90
(Apr.
7,
2009),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf.
120. The four safeguards specified in Article 3 of the Optional Protocol are:
(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;
(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the
person’s parents or legal guardians;
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such
military service;
(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into
national military service.
Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3.
121. See id.
122. Bartlet, supra note 40.
123. See Army ‘Targeting Poorer Schools’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/6199274.stm; see also RECRUITMENT OF
MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCES, supra note 9, at 11.
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forces. Moreover, recruits must be able to leave if they wish to
do so.124
Article 3(1) of the Optional Protocol requires states to raise
the legal age for voluntary recruitment to at least sixteen years
of age. Upon ratification of the Optional Protocol, states must
deposit a binding declaration setting out the standards in place
to meet their legal obligations in pursuance of the Optional
Protocol. The United Kingdom has adopted the minimum
standard established in the Optional Protocol—recruitment
from sixteen years of age onwards—and has failed to issue a
declaration to abide by the higher standard of eighteen years of
age. Further, the United Kingdom has deposited a declaration125 allowing for sixteen year olds to be deployed.126 Despite
124. This is a highly debated issue in the United Kingdom. Whilst a recruit
has a right to discharge “at the end of the first month of training and before
six months have elapsed since enlistment” once that period has elapsed discharge is at the discretion of the commanding officer. THE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON THE ARMED FORCES BILL, THE ARMED FORCES BILL: SPECIAL REPORT OF
SESSION 2010–11, H.C. 779, at Ev 76. As a result, the Joint Committee on
Human Rights has expressed its concern that this lack of right to leave might
be in breach of the Optional Protocol. ARMED FORCES BILL, 2010–12, supra,
note 80, ¶ 1.58; see also RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCES,
supra note 9, at 3–4. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, transmitted in
consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 8 of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ¶¶ 16–17, CRC/C/OPAC/GBR/CO/1
(Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Concluding Observations: UK].
125. The Declaration reads:
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will
take all feasible measures to ensure that members of its armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part
in hostilities.
The United Kingdom understands that Article 1 of the Optional Protocol would not exclude the deployment of members of its armed
forces under the age of 18 to take a direct part in hostilities where:
a) there is a genuine military need to deploy their unit or ship to an
area in which hostilities are taking place; and
b) by reason of the nature and urgency of the situation:
i) it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before deployment; or
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repeated calls by NGOs and the Committee on the Rights of the
Child,127 the United Kingdom has not amended its interpretative declaration, which has the effect of a reservation, to the
aforementioned instrument. Although this provision of the Optional Protocol has been criticized for still allowing recruitment
of children between sixteen and eighteen years of age,128 states
insisted upon it to keep the armed forces available as a source
of employment, training, and continuing education for those
leaving school early.129 Additionally, it is argued that it would
take a couple of years to train a soldier fully before sending him
or her to a conflict theatre.130
During wars of national liberation, a number of children willingly and strategically joined armed groups. Undoubtedly, ideological attraction plays a significant role in the involvement of
children in such conflicts131 and this is why Additional Protocol
I allows the direct participation in hostilities of children under
fifteen years of age. The Commentary to the Additional Protocol I expounds that the Committee that designed this provision
“noted that sometimes, especially in occupied territories and in
wars of national liberation, it would not be realistic to totally
prohibit voluntary participation of children under fifteen”132 as
“[i]t is difficult to moderate [the children’s] enthusiasm and

ii) to do so would undermine the operational effectiveness of
their ship or unit, and thereby put at risk the successful
completion of the military mission and-or the safety of other
personnel.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Declaration upon Signature of the
United Kingdom, entered into force Feb. 12, 2002, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222.
126. See Armed Forces (Enlistment) Regulations, 2009, S.I. 2009/2057, art.
4 (U.K.); see also Concluding Observations: UK, supra note 124, ¶¶ 12–19.
127. RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCES, supra note 9; see
also Concluding Observations: UK, supra note 124, ¶¶ 10–11; CHILD
SOLDIERS INT’L, supra note 81, ¶ 4.
128. See HARVEY, supra note 51, at 28; Jay Williams, The International
Campaign to Prohibit Child Soldiers: A Critical Evaluation, 15 INT’L J. HUM.
RTS. 1072, 1076 (2011).
129. Breen, supra note 113, at 71–72.
130. Id. at 90–91.
131. One may nonetheless question how “voluntary” this type of involvement is.
132. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 3184.
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their will to fight.”133 In such cases, the Commentary highlights
that
the authorities employing or commanding [children] should be
conscious of the heavy responsibility they are assuming and
should remember that they are dealing with persons who are
not yet sufficiently mature, or even have the necessary discernment of discrimination. Thus they should give them the
appropriate instruction on handling weapons, the conduct of
combatants and respect for the laws and customs of war.134

This provision in international humanitarian law seems to allow recruiters, if prosecuted for recruitment of children under
fifteen years of age, to raise the defense of consent by the child.
However, the jurisprudence of various international criminal
tribunals asserts that consent of an under fifteen year old child
to taking part in the hostilities does not constitute a valid defense for a recruiter accused of recruitment.135 In other words,
whilst a child can voluntarily join an armed group, his or her
enlistment is a punishable offense under international criminal
law.136
In the “new wars,” children join armed groups and armed
forces for a range of reasons.137 The main “push and pull factors”138 can be divided in three broad categories: (1) “environmental factors,” (2) “factors relating to the child’s personal

133. Id. ¶ 3185.
134. Id.
135. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶¶ 613–
17 (March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf; Prosecutor v. Fofana (CDF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶
139
(May
28,
2008),
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9xsCbIVrMlY%3d&tabid=194.
136. “Given that both (voluntary) enlistment and (coerced) conscription are
ways of committing the same offence, the question of consent loses its relevance for the purposes of conviction.” Roman Graf, The International Criminal Court and Child Soldiers: An Appraisal of the Lubanga Judgment, 10
JICJ 945, 956 (2012).
137. For an excellent overview, see Rachel Brett, Adolescents Volunteering
for Armed Forces or Armed Groups, 85 IRRC 857, 859–62 (2003) (claiming
that there are “five major factors in the decision of youngsters to join armed
forces or armed groups” without being coerced: “war, poverty, education, employment and family”).
138. For the origins of this expression, see Somasundaram, supra note 70,
at 1268.

1076

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

characteristics and histories,” and (3) “trigger events.”139 Factors include economic hardship and poverty,140 the lack of opportunities,141 a sense of belonging, ideological attraction, feelings of revenge,142 survival, the loss of parents and relatives
able to protect them,143 the need to find a safe environment,144
the impression that one is able to act free of coercion, and thus
be proactive rather than passive and victimized,145 fear of being
abducted,146 etc. Children may also be sent by their families to
defend the community147 or to find a basic source of income. In
other cases, school curricula contain military elements, which
contribute to the indoctrination of the children who may wish
to join “willingly,” yet are arguably not fully able to understand
the ideological nature of their decision or to adequately assess
the implications of their decisions and actions.148 It is the combination of these factors that accentuates and amplifies the

139. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 52. Based on the conflicts in Sierra Leone
and Liberia, William Murphy four categories of child solders: “coerced youth,”
“revolutionary youth,” “delinquent youth,” and “youth clientalism.” Murphy,
supra note 75, at 64–66.
140. MATTHEW HAPPOLD, CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005);
Radhika Coomaraswamy, The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict—
Towards Universal Ratification, 18 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 535, 536 (2010).
141. WESSELLS, supra note 107, at 50.
142. Diane Taylor, I Wanted to Take Revenge, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2006),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/07/westafrica.congo; Coomaraswamy, supra note 140, at 536.
143. HAPPOLD, supra note 140, at 13; WESSELLS, supra note 107, at 49.
144. SINGER, supra note 65, at 64 (noting that “children may decide they are
safer in a conflict group, with guns in their own hands, than going about by
themselves unarmed.”).
145. See Hughes, supra note 7, at 403.
146. Harendra de Silva, Chris Hobbs & Helga Hanks, Conscription of Children in Armed Conflict—A Form of Child Abuse. A Study of 19 Former Child
Soldiers, 10 CHILD ABUSE REV. 125, 128 (2001).
147. “Societal attitudes, as advanced by community leaders, teachers and
parents, and their peers can direct children to the conclusion that that the
best way of . . . displaying maturity and becoming a full member of the collective is to join the struggle.” HAPPOLD, supra note 140, at 140; see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Witness Testimony DRC-OTPWWW-0046,
at
18
(July
9,
2009),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc713215.pdf; Child Solder Recruitment, supra note 66, at
51 (illustrating example of children enlisting in the Kamajors in Sierra Leone).
148. See de Silva, Hobbs & Hanks, supra note 146, at 130.
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child’s willingness to take a part in the hostilities. Voluntary
recruitment in this specific context is defined as not being abducted or physically forced to join a party to the conflict, as a
“coerced choice.” In her written submission to the ICC in the
Lubanga case, the Special Representative stressed that “[t]he
line between voluntary and forced recruitment is therefore not
only legally irrelevant but practically superficial in the context
of children in armed conflict.”149 Whilst the Special Representative prefers to ignore the relevance of the variety of push and
pull factors that lead a child into soldiering, others claim that
along a continuum starting with informed consent and ending
with abduction there are various degrees of choices.150 As Rachel Brett aptly notes, “the degree of choice varied,”151 and Alice Schmidt stresses, “children choose to join armed groups despite having alternatives that—under the given circumstances—are acceptable.”152 Also, a fair number of children who
joined armed groups believed that they would be able to leave
at any time or had no, or very little, idea of what war really entailed.153
3. Conscription
Conscripting children under fifteen years of age is clearly
prohibited under international humanitarian and human
rights law treaties, customary international humanitarian
law,154 and international criminal law.155 Article 2 of Optional
Protocol outlaws the compulsory recruitment of persons under
the age of eighteen years. Whilst conscription is clearly banned
149. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Written Submissions of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 14 (Mar. 18, 2008).
150. Whilst in social sciences it might be possible to conceive of voluntariness along a continuum or spectrum, in law, a distinction must unfortunately
be made unless all participation is deemed lawful or unlawful. For a discussion on the possibility to think of voluntariness along a continuum or spectrum, see Schmidt, supra note 116, at 55–57.
151. Brett, supra note 137, at 863.
152. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 54.
153. Brett, supra note 137, at 863.
154. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at 485.
155. The Rome Statute provides that “‘conscripting or enlisting children’
into armed forces or groups constitutes a war crime in both international and
non-international armed conflicts.” Id. at 483 (citing Rome Statute, supra
note 27, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii)).
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with regard to children under fifteen years of age, the question
is whether it is also banned with regard to children between
fifteen and eighteen years of age. Again, international human
rights law raises the minimum age of permissible recruitment
while other relevant branches of international law specify an
age of fifteen.
Conscription is traditionally viewed as the prerogative of the
state to require its nationals to take part in some form of national services, in this case, military service.156 By definition,
conscription is compulsory and, thus, coerced. Failure to comply with conscription often leads to imprisonment.157 The great
majority of states do not conscript individuals under eighteen
years of age and the Optional Protocol specifies a minimum age
of eighteen or more. Yet, despite the existence of legal safeguards set by states to combat forced recruitment, inefficiency,
corruption, and structural inadequacies mar the system; “[a]s a
result, forced recruitment occurs even in states where legislation is in place to prohibit compulsory military service before
the age of eighteen.”158 One of the reasons for this is that many
states do not properly document the age of people, which has
the effect of facilitating the recruitment of minors as a state
can always argue that it was not aware that the child was under eighteen years of age.
As explained earlier, conscription, in its contemporary understanding, encompasses abductions, forced recruitment, and
forced military training.159 The Trial Chamber of the Special
Court of Sierra Leone explained in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (“AFRC”) case that conscription should be interpreted as “encompass[ing] acts of coercion, such as abductions and forced recruitment . . . committed for the purpose of

156. Prosecutor v. Brima (AFRC Case), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Judgment,
¶
734
(June
20,
2007),
http://www.scsl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/TrialChamberJ
udgment/tabid/173/Default.aspx.
157. For examples, see situations in Germany until 2011, and also those in
Finland and Russian Federation.
158. Stephanie Bald, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court
of Sierra Leone Find Justice for Its Children?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 537, 548
(2002).
159. Prosecutor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment,
¶¶
1695,
1700,
1707
(Mar.
2,
2009),
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215.
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using them to participate actively in hostilities.”160 Even if
children are not actually used in the conflict, their abduction
with the aim of using them is sufficient to sustain a conviction
for conscription.161 The law in this area has been interpreted
such that it applies to non-international armed conflicts.162
Although it is clear that no children under fifteen years of
age under international humanitarian law or under eighteen
years of age according to the Optional Protocol can be recruited, the reality is very different. Owing to the general lack of
enforcement of such laws, e.g. punishment for armed groups
when they recruit children, forced recruitment has become endemic in many of these conflicts (e.g., the conflict in Sierra Leone).163
4. Enlistment
On the other hand, enlistment, which is understood as allowing individuals to enroll to join an armed force or group,164 is
not clearly banned by international humanitarian law. To some
extent, this lack of prohibition caters to the fact that not all
children are forced into soldiering. As discussed earlier, many
choose to join an armed group or a state’s armed forces of their
own volition.
According to international humanitarian law treaties, enlistment is only banned in a non-international armed conflict.
Enlistment in an international armed conflict is allowed. Indeed, under Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I, if such children voluntarily enlist in the armed forces, there is no obligation upon the state to refuse the new recruit.165 The general
prohibition of recruitment in non-international armed conflicts
under Article 4(3) of Additional Protocol II is to be welcomed
because the great majority of cases of child recruitment today
take place within the context of non-international armed conflicts. That being said, customary international humanitarian

160. AFRC Case, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, ¶ 734.
161. RUF Case, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, ¶ 1700.
162. Id. ¶ 194.
163. Aubrey F. Mitchell III, Sierra Leone: The Road to Childhood Ruination
Through Forced Recruitment of Child Soldiers and the World’s Failure to Act,
2 REGENT J. INT’L L. 81, 85–87, 102–03 (2003–04).
164. AFRC Case, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, ¶ 735.
165. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 77(2).
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law bans enlistment in all conflicts,166 whilst the UNCRC and
the Optional Protocol ban enlistment of children without referring to the type of conflict involved.167
An important aspect of the prohibition of enlistment is that
international humanitarian law is binding upon armed forces
and armed groups.168 In contrast, the UNCRC, as a human
rights law treaty, can only bind a state’s armed forces.169 As
many contemporary conflicts are of non-international nature
and pit armed opposition groups against each other, it is imperative that there are provisions relating to non-state actors.
Hence, the Optional Protocol adopts a more demanding position, asserting that “[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the
armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances,
recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18
years.”170 Still, one of the main flaws of Article 4 of the Optional
Protocol, and any human rights instruments in general, cannot
bind non-state actors171 as they cannot sign up to the agreements in the first place. The device used to ensure compliance
of armed opposition groups with human rights law is by virtue
of national law inasmuch as States are, in pursuance of the Optional Protocol, required to criminalize forced recruitment carried out by armed opposition groups.172 Remarkably, the U.N.
Secretary-General explains in Children and Armed Conflict
that armed opposition groups are to be held to the same standards as those of the state in which they are fighting.173 Indeed,
166. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at 483–85.
167. Neither Article 38 of UNCRC nor Articles 1 through 4 of the Optional
Protocol refers to the type of conflict involved.
168. See Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen, International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 IRRC 47, 52–63
(2011); Pascal Bongard & Jonathan Somer, Monitoring Armed Non-State Actor Compliance with Humanitarian Norms: A Look at International Mechanisms and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 93 IRRC 673, 674–75
(2011).
169. Matthew Happold, Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: Harnessing
the Security Council’s ‘Soft Power,’ 43 ISR. L. REV. 360, 364 (2010).
170. Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 4(1).
171. See Mendez, supra note 12, at 230; see also Wasantha Seneviratne,
International Legal Standards Applicable to Child Soldiers, 15 SRI LANKA J.
INT’L L. 39, 41 (2003).
172. Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 4(2).
173. See U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1299 (Nov. 26, 2002). The minimum standard, as spelled out in the UNCRC, Additional Protocol II, and the
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as Matthew Happold notes “[w]hereas it is generally agreed
that [non-state armed groups] have obligations in international
humanitarian law, it remains disputed whether they are bound
by international human rights law . . . .”174
As a result, it is generally agreed that, as a matter of customary international law, the recruitment of children under
the fifteen years of age into armed forces and armed groups,
whether in international or non-international armed conflict, is
prohibited. No distinction is made as to whether recruitment
was compulsory or voluntary. There might be an emerging
norm barring the compulsory recruitment of children under
eighteen years of age, but this does not seem to be universally
accepted at the moment.175
B. Use and Participation of Children in Armed Conflict
In addition to the recruitment, conscription, and enlistment
of children, international law also regulates children’s participation in armed conflict. The type of legal framework that is
applied in regulation of children’s participation in such conflict,
whether it be international humanitarian law, human rights
law, international criminal law, or a combination of these, will
determine which kinds of participation are prohibited.
The 1977 Additional Protocols were the first international legal instruments to regulate the participation of children under
fifteen years of age. According to Article 77(2) of Additional
Protocol I, children are barred from “tak[ing] a direct part in
hostilities” in international armed conflict.176 In contrast, ArtiRome Statute is that “children under age 15 shall not be conscripted or enlisted into armed groups or used by them to participate actively in hostilities
in either international or internal armed conflicts.” Id. The higher standard
regarding non-state armed groups is from the Optional Protocol that prohibits the recruitment and use of children under the age of eighteen. See Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 1.
174. Happold, supra note 169, at 374.
175. Whilst some armed opposition groups agree that no child below the age
of eighteen years old should be recruited, others prefer to set a lower threshold. For the discussion on the position of armed opposition groups on the recruitment of children, see generally Jonathan Somer, Engaging Armed NonState Actors to Protect Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict: When the
Stick Doesn’t Cut the Mustard, 4 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 106 (2012).
176. The Commentary to Article 51(3) Additional Protocol I explains that
“‘direct’ participation means acts of war which by their nature or purpose are
likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy
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cle 4(3)(c) of the Additional Protocol II does not use the adjective “direct,” thus encompassing indirect functions such as
“gathering information, transmitting orders, transporting munitions or foodstuffs or committing acts of sabotage.”177 This
distinction in terminology prompted the ICRC to comment that
since “[t]he intention of the drafters of the article was clearly to
keep children under fifteen outside armed conflict,”178 indirect
participation in international armed conflict should also be
ruled out. A resolution adopted at the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 1995 reinforces
this position: “parties to conflict . . . take every feasible step to
ensure that children under the age of 18 years do not take part
in hostilities,” thereby refraining from using any adjective such
as “direct” or “indirect” before “take part.”179 The Abo Turku
declaration, which is considered to encapsulate minimum
standards of humanity, also stresses that children should not
take part in acts of violence, thereby setting a higher standard
than the “direct participation” expression enshrined in Additional Protocol I.180 Rule 137 of the Study of Customary Interarmed forces.” PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 1944. This definition is reiterated verbatim in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment
and
Sentence,
¶
99
(Dec.
6,
1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.p
df. In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a publication with the aim to assist in delimiting the borders between direct and other
types of participation in hostilities. See generally NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN
LAW
(2009),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. For a discussion
on this publication, see generally Michael N. Schmitt, Direct Participation in
Hostilities: Perspectives on the ICRC Interpretive Guidance: Deconstructing
Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2009–10).
177. Maria Teresa Dutli, Captured Child Combatants, 30 IRRC 421, 423
(1990).
178. “The intention of the drafters of the article was clearly to keep children
under fifteen outside armed conflict, and consequently they should not be
required to perform such services.” PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 3187.
179. ICRC, Resolution 2: Protection of the Civilian Population in Period of
Armed Conflict, § C(d), 26th Int’l Conference (Jul. 12, 1995), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/26-internationalconference-resolution-2-1995.htm.
180. Comm. on Human Rights Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian
Standards (Declaration of Turku), 51st Sess., Jan. 30–Mar. 10, 1995, reprinted in report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
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national Humanitarian Law confirms that the expression “participat[ion] in hostilities” encompasses both direct and indirect
acts that affect the enemy forces.181
International human rights law also prohibits children’s participation in armed conflict. Article 38 of the UNCRC prohibits
the direct participation of children under fifteen years of age in
hostilities.182 The Optional Protocol uses similar wording but
stipulates that the age be eighteen years.183 Notwithstanding,
one may argue that due to the wording used (i.e., “do not take
direct part in hostilities”) these provisions seem to allow for, or
at least do not preclude, indirect participation in hostilities.184
In this sense, there is congruence among the UNCRC, the Optional Protocol, and international humanitarian law instruments in the sense that they all forbid direct participation in
hostilities. Arguably, the relevant provision in Additional Protocol I that governs international armed conflict should be interpreted as to align it with customary international humanitarian law.185 Therefore, it is argued that the lex specialis (i.e.,
the Additional Protocol I and customary international humanitarian law) goes further than human rights law in relation to
the types of participation by children in armed conflict that it
prohibits.
Additional Protocol II, by virtue of the lex specialis character
of international humanitarian law, supersedes the UNCRC and
its Optional Protocol for those cases of non-international armed
conflict governed by it, which means that all forms of participation are prohibited since Additional Protocol II bans all forms
of participation. Nevertheless, to the extent that Additional
tection of Minorities on its 46th Session, art. 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/116
(1995); see also Theodor Meron & Allan Rosas, A Declaration of Minimum
Humanitarian Standards, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 375–81 (1991).
181. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at 485–88.
182. As previously explained, the UNCRC does not bind non-state entities
such as armed opposition groups. A notable exception is the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement and the South Sudan Independence Movement which
in July 1995 committed themselves to the UNCRC (Save the Children Sweden, 1996).
183. See Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 1.
184. Seneviratne, supra note 171, at 43.
185. By virtue of the lex posterior rule and Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Additional Protocol I should be interpreted in
light of subsequent rules. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.
31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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Protocol II will not apply because of non-international armed
conflict’s inability to reach the threshold set out in Article 1(1),
then Article 38 of the UNCRC and Article 1 of the Optional
Protocol will be the only legal instruments that will apply in a
non-international armed conflict that falls within the scope of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.186 Consequently,
one must refer to the norms established in customary international humanitarian law that prohibit both the direct and indirect participation of children in non-international armed conflict. Again, human rights law is less restrictive than international humanitarian law; however, the difference lies in the set
age because the Optional Protocol prohibits the direct participation of children under eighteen years of age.
Whilst binding legal instruments such as treaties and customary international law, whether relating to international
humanitarian law or human rights law, are of utmost importance, it is crucial to examine non-binding instruments as
they often show a trend in international law. In the instance,
non-binding instruments such as the Paris Commitments
adopted in February 2007187 and the 1997 Cape Town Principles188 have broadened the definition of a child taking part in
the hostilities. Both instruments deal with children below
eighteen years of age in armed conflict. Yet, they differ in their
approaches. Paragraph 6 of the Paris Commitments employs
the expression “us[ing] them to participate actively in hostilities,” which indicates that participation must take a direct
186. As the threshold of applicability for non-international armed conflicts
in Additional Protocol II is high, the overwhelming majority of noninternational armed conflicts fall within the scope of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.
187. ICRC, The Paris Commitments Consolidated Version: The Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed
Forces
or
Armed
Groups,
¶¶
6,
11
(2007),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/the-paris-commitments.pdf.
It
should be noted that the ICRC uses this definition. See ICRC, Child Soldiers
and Other Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups, at 2,
Publication
Ref.
0824
(2012),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0824.pdf.
188. United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], Cape Town Principles and
Best Practices Adopted at the Symposium on the Prevention of Recruitment of
Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa (Apr. 27–30, 1997), available at
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf [hereinafter
Cape Town Principles].
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form—though “active” is considered to be broader than “direct.”189 The term “used” seems to indicate that the focus shifts
away from the children (i.e., children take part in the hostilities) and turn to those who are making them take an active
part in the hostilities (i.e., individuals “use” children). Moreover, the choice of the word “use” rather than “participation” denotes an objectification of the child that clearly impacts on how
recruitment is perceived from the perspective of those recruiting children rather than of the children themselves.
Going a step further, the 1997 Cape Town Principles concentrate on the concept of a child soldier, making no distinction
between direct/active and indirect participation.190 Under the
Principles, a child soldier is defined as “[a]ny person under 18
years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not
limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. It includes girls
recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It does not,
therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried
arms.”191 Machel also argues for such a definition in her 2001
follow-up book,192 and it certainly seems to better reflect the
myriad of tasks in which children are involved.193 But does this
mean that all forms of participation in hostilities turn children
into child soldiers?194
A growing body of international criminal law deals with the
use of children under fifteen years of age in armed conflict. According to the Rome Statute, it is a crime to compel children to

189. For the distinction between “direct” and “active,” see Waschefort, supra
note 73, at 194–95, 197–98.
190. As Janet McKnight elucidates, the distinction between direct and indirect participation was abandoned. See McKnight, supra note 54, at 119.
191. Cape Town Principles, supra note 188, at 8 (under the heading “Definitions”).
192. GRAÇA MACHEL, THE IMPACT OF WAR ON CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF
PROGRESS SINCE THE 1996 UNITED NATIONS REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED
CONFLICT ON CHILDREN 7 (2001).
193. See discussion below for the types of activities in which children are
involved.
194. Janet McKnight explains that “[p]arties disagree on whether international law is meant to protect only child combatants that directly participate
in battle or whether such protection extends to all children involved in the
conflict.” McKnight, supra note 54, at 115.
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participate in armed conflict.195 During the negotiation process,
it was argued that the expression “participate actively,”196 as
enounced in the Rome Statute in Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) under
the context of international armed conflict and 8(2)(e)(vii) under the context of non-international armed conflict,197 covers
not only direct participation in combat activities but also military-related activities such as “scouting, spying, sabotage, and
the use of children as . . . couriers . . . .”198 This also includes
such activities as taking supplies to the front line.199 The word
“using” reinforces the wish of the drafters of the Rome Statute
to prohibit the participation of children in hostilities in general,
rather than in combat only. Activities “unrelated to the hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase [or] the use of domestic staff in an officer’s married accommodation,”200 however, do
not qualify as participation in hostilities.201 This infers that
195. See Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii).
196. In international criminal law, the word “actively” rather than “directly” is used. In IHL both “directly” and “actively” are used. Due to space constraints, it is not possible to elaborate here on the difference in terminology.
For an in-depth discussion on this subject, see Waschefort, supra note 73, at
194–95, 197–98.
197. See Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), (2)(b)(e)(vii). Here,
it must be noted that the threshold of applicability for non-international
armed conflicts is lower since it does not require that the conflict fall within
the purview of Additional Protocol II. The crime of using children in armed
conflict may also be committed in Geneva Convention Common Article 3 conflicts.
198. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15–July 17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, at 21, n.12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (April 14, 1998),
available at http://www.un.org/law/n9810105.pdf [hereinafter Report of the
Preparatory Committee]. This interpretation is confirmed in the Lubanga
judgment. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment,
¶¶
624–27
(March
14,
2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
199. The Special Court for Sierra Leone added that carrying looted goods is
also tantamount to active participation in the hostilities. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 1546 (May 18, 2012).
200. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 198, at 21 n.12.
201. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 262 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf. However, in the Taylor case, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone explained that if “a clear link between the [foodfinding] mission and the hostilities” can be demonstrated, this constitutes
active participation in the hostilities. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, ¶ 1479.
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domestic labor, cooking, and other similar activities are therefore not prohibited by international law. Although these activities are “vital for group survival in terms of logistics,”202 they
do not appear to fall within the scope of the prohibition. That
being said the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case appears to
have widened the remit of the prohibition as it replaced the
test of active participation by one relating to exposure to danger.203
An unintended consequence of broadly-defined “active participation” in hostilities is that children might then become legitimate targets for military operations,204 as the Trial Chamber
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone stated in the Revolutionary United Front case205 and the Taylor case,206 and as the ICC
stated in the Lubanga case.207 For this reason, one must be
mindful not to give too broad an interpretation to the concept of
“active participation in hostilities,” and apply it in an international humanitarian law context since this would correspondingly reduce the number of children who would be legally protected from direct attack.208 For example, the use of children to
commit crimes against civilians is deemed to constitute active
participation in hostilities, a position that is understandable as
202. FLORENCE TERCIER HOLST-RONESS, ICRC, VIOLENCE AGAINST GIRLS IN
AFRICA DURING ARMED CONFLICTS AND CRISES (REPORT AT SECOND
INTERNATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON THE AFRICAN CHILD: VIOLENCE
AGAINST GIRLS IN AFRICA, MAY 11–12, 2006), 14, available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/international-policy-conference.pdf
(referring to activities such “cooking, fetching water and wood, cleaning, caring for the sick and wounded.”).
203. “The decisive factor in deciding whether an indirect role is to be treated as active participation in hostilities is whether the support provided by the
child to the combatants exposed him or her to real danger by becoming a potential target.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment,
¶ 820 (March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
204. See Graf, supra note 136, at 963–64.
205. See Prosecutor v. Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment,
¶
1723
(Mar.
2,
2009),
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215.
206. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, ¶¶ 1459, 1604.
207. “All of [children’s] activities [that support combatants], which cover
either direct or indirect participation, have an underlying common feature:
the child concerned is, at the very least, a potential target.” Prosecutor v.
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 628 (March 14, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
208. Waschefort, supra note 73, at 200.
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such acts of violence are directly linked to hostilities.209 The
Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case explained that “[t]he decisive factor, therefore, in deciding if an ‘indirect’ role is to be
treated as active participation in hostilities is whether the support provided by the child to the combatants exposed him or
her to real danger as a potential target.”210 In other words, a
sweeping statement that a child is “used in hostilities” because
any of his or her activities actively contribute to the hostilities
is ill advised. As long as children are involved in conflict, it
might not be sensible to broaden the concept of a child soldier
in international humanitarian law too far and refer to “active”
rather than “direct” participation in hostilities. This reveals
that the current liberal approach of the international community towards the child soldier phenomenon (e.g., definition such
as the one enshrined in the Cape Town Principles) is at odds
with international humanitarian law and the realities of war;
this concept appears to be better grasped by international criminal tribunals.
III. THE DISCOURSE CONDEMNING CHILD SOLDIERING: A
“POLITICS OF AGE”
David M. Rosen argues that “the ‘problem’ of child soldiers . .
. derives not from any new phenomenon of young people being
present on the battlefield but, rather, from an emerging transnational ‘politics of age’ that shapes the concept of ‘childhood’
in international law.”211 As demonstrated earlier, the child soldier phenomenon is not new; in the past, those young people
taking part in the hostilities were not branded “child soldier”
but “brave young men” or young “heroes.”212 The key explanation for this seems to be the adoption of a human rights discourse, especially a discourse of children’s rights, rather than
an international humanitarian law framework. This discourse
stems from the liberal Western values that define childhood213

209. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, ¶ 1604.
210. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶ 628.
211. Rosen, supra note 18.
212. See Lee, supra note 21, at 3.
213. As Nancy Kendall explains, “international definitions of childhood and
vulnerability have been critiqued as rooted in Western ideas about individuals and their relationships.” Nancy Kendall, Gendered Moral Dimensions of
Childhood Vulnerability, 2 CHILD. AFR. 26, 27 (2010).
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as a long period of innocence and fun,214 and it aims to spread
such values universally. Moreover by taking a human rights
approach to the issue of child soldiering, the liberal discourse
becomes a humanitarian one that indistinctively strips children of their autonomy and thus ability to be agents of their
own lives and portrays them as innocent victims.
A. Universality
The first main factor for this change in the liberal discourse
is a re-conceptualization of childhood as “a particular generational and cultural space.”215 The current state of international
law models is based on the assumption that “childhood is different from adulthood and that it requires special protection,”216 for children are perceived “as defenceless, unable to
protect themselves and therefore dependent” on others.217
International humanitarian law takes two seemingly contradictory approaches in this regard. On the one hand, it offers
special protection to children (new-born,218 children under seven,219 children under twelve,220 children under fifteen,221 and

214. Hart, supra note 10, at 219–20 (noting that under the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, a childhood is intended to last until
the age of eighteen); Pupavac, supra note 53 (noting that “a prerequisite for
the Western protective model of childhood [is] . . . ‘happiness, love and understanding.’”).
215. James & James, supra note 11, at 31–32; see also Happold, supra note
169, at 361 (arguing that “perceptions of the boundaries and dimensions of
childhood have changed.”).
216. See Kendall, supra 213, at 27; Breen, supra note 113, at 73; McNee,
supra note 31, at 20 (quoting Mary Galbraith, Hear My Cry: A Manifesto for
an Emancipatory Childhood Studies Approach to Children’s Literature, 25
LION & UNICORN 187, 190 (2001)); RECRUITMENT OF MINORS IN BRITISH ARMED
FORCES, supra note 9, at 9–14. Moreover, the way we see children and “the
ways we behave toward them . . . shape” a child’s experience as a child and
his/her involvement with the adult world. James & James, supra note 11, at
27.
217. Julia Fionda, Legal Concepts of Childhood: An Introduction, in LEGAL
CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD 1, 9 (Julia Fionda ed., 2001).
218. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 24, art. 17 (noting “maternity
cases”).
219. See id. art. 14 (prescribing access for children under seven and their
mothers to hospital and safety zones); see also id. art. 38(5) (mothers of children under seven years benefit from preferential treatment).
220. See id. art. 24 (wearing of identification to preserve their identity in
case they are separated from their parents).
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children under eighteen222). On the other, the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and customary international
humanitarian law do not differentiate between children and
adults who take a direct part in the hostilities. When children
are involved in hostilities, they are considered as combatants in
international armed conflicts or persons taking a direct part in
the hostilities223 who can be targeted.224 And if captured, the
children benefit from the treatment of prisoners of war in international armed conflicts225 or if in non-international armed
conflicts, they can be captured and prosecuted for taking part
in the hostilities.226 What international humanitarian law prohibits is the recruitment of children, thus pointing the finger at
those who recruit them. Children as such are not violating international humanitarian law by taking a direct part in the
hostilities. Whilst this indicates that international humanitarian law is rather blind to the notion of childhood, in contradistinction to adulthood, once children are participants, this position fails to acknowledge that international humanitarian law
seeks to prevent the participation of children under fifteen
years of age in armed conflict in the first place and, thus, in-

221. See id. art. 14 (prescribing access for them and their mothers to hospital and safety zones); id. art. 23 (provision of relief supplies); id. art. 24 (child
welfare facilities); id. art. 38(5) (preferential treatment).
222. See id. art. 68(4) (protection against the death penalty); Additional
Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 77(5); Additional Protocol II, supra note 26, art.
6(4).
223. Stuart Maslen, Kinder sind keine Soldaten—politische und rechtliche
Aspekte des Phänomens Kindersoldaten [Children Are Not Soldiers—Political
and Legal Aspects of the Phenomenon of Child Soldiers], in FRIEDRICH-EBERTSTIFTUNG & UNICEF, supra note 65, at 23, 25.
224. When children participate in hostilities, they “lose their inviolability as
non-combatants; indeed, they become ‘legitimate’ military targets, individuals whose death or disablement result in that weakening of the armed forces
of the enemy which is the only legitimate aim in war.” GUY GOODWIN-GILL &
ILENE COHN, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 70
(1994).
225. The Commentary on the Additional Protocols explains that
“[t]heoretically prisoners of war may be very young or very old.” PILLOUD ET
AL., supra note 94, ¶ 3194.
226. Individuals, whether adults or children, who take part in hostilities in
non-international armed conflicts can, under domestic law, be detained and
prosecuted for taking part in the hostilities. See David M. Rosen, Who Is a
Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 81, 88–
90 (2009).
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stinctively disapproves of their involvement in hostilities.227 In
other words, international humanitarian law distinguishes between childhood and adulthood, and it follows the international
trend set in recent years by international human rights law.
The key is to demarcate the Rubicon between childhood and
adulthood. Technically, there are two ways to do this: either to
set a specific age for adulthood or to link adulthood to certain
skills and abilities. As Schmidt argues, “[i]n liberal thought,
chronological age draws a clear demarcating line between
childhood and adulthood,”228 which is a position found also in
the international legal and humanitarian discourse. The new
political agenda propagating the “straight eighteen” position229
aims to set up a new cultural and legal norm that will lead to a
single international definition of childhood as beginning at
birth and ending at age eighteen.230 The most common age for
individuals to obtain special protections under international
humanitarian law is fifteen years of age.231 A literal interpretation232 of the relevant provisions demonstrates that international humanitarian law considers a child to be anyone under
eighteen years of age.233 Rosen argues that this holds “open the
possibility that the concept of ‘childhood’ could be extended beyond [the age of fifteen].”234 Moreover, “[t]o adopt a general notion of ‘child’ in the absence of a definition, as being relevant
only those under 15 years of age, would be detrimental to the
227. See ICRC, Plan of Action Concerning Children in Armed Conflict, at 3–
4,
Ref.
95/CD/10/1
(Feb.
12,
1995),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/movement-plan-of-action-children1995.pdf [hereinafter Plan of Action] (“Objective 1.2.[:] Prevent children from
joining armed forces or groups by offering them alternatives to enlistment.”).
228. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 57.
229. “[I]nternational advocacy has now created a human rights framework,
that raises the minimum age for recruitment and participation in hostilities
from fifteen to eighteen.” Coomaraswamy, supra note 140, at 536; see also
Lee, supra note 21.
230. See Rosen, supra note 18, at 296–97; see also Matthew Happold, Child
Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators?, 29 U. LA. VERNE L. REV. 56, 69–70 (2008).
231. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at 479–82.
232. See generally Daniel Helle, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 82
IRRC 797 (2000).
233. The Conventions refer to “persons under 18 years of age” and “children
under 15” thereby implying that there are children above fifteen years of age.
See id. at 803–04; Fox, supra note 13, at 31.
234. Rosen, supra note 18, at 301.
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interest of the child and thus not in conformity with the spirit
underlying international humanitarian law.”235
Nevertheless, the Commentaries to the relevant treaty provisions do not seem to entirely support this standpoint. The
Commentary to Article 14 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
explains that the age of fifteen was set to match the “physical
and mental development of children,”236 though Article 77 of
Additional Protocol I concedes that “some flexibility is appropriate, for there are individuals who remain children, both
physically and mentally, after the age of fifteen.”237 Therefore,
it is difficult to rigidly conclude for purposes of international
humanitarian law that a child is simply anyone under eighteen
years of age.
Furthermore, whereas international humanitarian law does
not prohibit the recruitment and participation of children
above fifteen years of age, the ICRC, together with the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, considers that no
children under eighteen years of age should be recruited or
used in hostilities.238 This, of course, follows the Optional Protocol and the latest position in international human rights law
that define children as persons younger than eighteen years of
age. For example, the 1995 Plan of Action Concerning Children
in Armed Conflict shows that the International Movement of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent militates in favor of no recruitment and no use of children under the age of eighteen.239
Should international humanitarian law follow a policy that is
congruent with international human rights law? This would be
difficult to achieve because, interestingly, some of the opponents to the straight eighteen approach are liberal states such
as the United States of America and the United Kingdom even
though they have ratified the Optional Protocol.

235. Helle, supra note 232, at 804.
236. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
12 AUGUST 1949: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 126 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958).
237. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 3179.
238. Plan of Action, supra note 227, at 1 (“Commitment 1: To promote the
principle of non-recruitment and non-participation in armed conflict of children under the age of 18 years.”); see also ICRC, Peace, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, § 1.5, Council of Delegates Res. No. 8 (Nov.
27, 1997).
239. Plan of Action, supra note 227, at 1.
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The straight eighteen approach appears to contradict established cultural and local norms. Given that international human rights law is based on universal ethical standards,240 some
claim that the straight eighteen approach does not
acknowledge local and regional cultures and traditions, including differing views as to who is a child and who is an adult.241
Hence, a contextual approach that pays heed to “the culturally
constructed” and developed ideas and “practices of childhood
versus adulthood”242 might be more appropriate in this area.
Remarkably, this is also the approach taken by Article 1 of the
UNCRC, since this provision states that adulthood can be
reached before eighteen years of age if majority is attained earlier in a specific state, thus allowing states to set an age for majority that is in line with cultural and social norms.243 Contextualists, who interpret the law by paying particular attention
to the social and cultural context in which norms are applied,
contend that the cut-off age between childhood and adulthood
needs to be challenged.244 Initiation rites, culturally scripted
phenomena that are not determined by an abstract age, are the
true markers of the passage into adulthood.245 Conspicuously,
there is a difference between the categorizations and definitions made by local communities and those established by the
international legal discourse.246
240. “[S]ome basic human goods span the considerable diversity of modern
cultures and support a set of ethical standards that are universal at least for
the world as we know it and human beings as we know them.” Amy Gutmann, The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 171, 193 (1993).
241. See generally Rosen, supra note 18; Child Soldier Recruitment, supra
note 66.
242. Fox, supra note 13, at 43.
243. UNCRC, supra note 22.
244. See generally Rosen, supra note 18; Child Soldier Recruitment, supra
note 66.
245. “One of the most important of these differences was that communities
did not view 18 as the age at which children suddenly transitioned to adulthood.” Kendall, supra 213, at 32; see also Child Soldier Recruitment, supra
note 66, at 52.
246. See McKnight, supra note 54, at 125. This discourse informs and is fed
by “researchers [who] tend to assume a ‘universal decontextualized model of
child development.’ That is, researchers tend to forget that ‘childhood, adolescence and adulthood are . . . socially defined statuses which include social
expectations that differ across cultures.’” ED CAIRNS, CHILDREN AND POLITICAL
VIOLENCE 166 (1996); see also Lee, supra note 21, at 8.
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Anthropological research underwrites this assertion, stressing that “there are a multiplicity of childhoods, each culturally
codified and defined by age, ethnicity, gender, history, location,
and so forth.”247 Since law is applied within a specific context,
ignoring such context whilst drafting universal norms inevitably leads to discrepancies between the state of the law and its
application.248 The importance of cultural legitimacy of international human rights norms is overlooked.
While the efforts of the NGO community to limit the extent
and number of individuals embroiled in armed conflicts must
be praised, it should be stressed that NGOs and political
groups discount the “more varied and complex local understandings of children and childhood found in anthropological
research.”249 Article 1 of the UNCRC acknowledges this assertion by leaving states some leeway in deciding when majority is
attained.250 The definition of a child soldier under UNCRC
clashes with local understandings of the involvement of young
people in armed conflicts.251 For example, anthropologists point
out that “[i]t is a misnomer in many parts of Africa to call a 14year-old carrying an AK-47 a child soldier since local people
may regard that young person as an adult”252 and that childhood and military life are not necessary understood as either
incompatible or contradictory.253 Moreover, the demography of
African countries, where the population is mainly comprised of
children—individuals under eighteen254—helps to explain the
fact that children there often take on earlier adult responsibili-

247. Rosen, supra note 18, at 297.
248. See Jonasen, supra note 42, at 316.
249. Rosen, supra note 18.
250. “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to
the child, majority is attained earlier.” UNCRC, supra note 22, art. 1.
251. See Rosen, supra note 18, at 297.
252. Michael Wessells & Davidson Jonah, Recruitment and Reintegration of
Former Youth Soldiers in Sierra Leone: Challenges of Reconciliation and
Post-accord Peacebuilding, in TROUBLEMAKERS OR PEACEMAKERS? YOUTH AND
POST-ACCORD PEACEBUILDING 27, 29 (Siobhan McEvoy-Levy ed., 2006).
253. For example, “[t]he Dinka of the Sudan initiated boys into warriorhood
between ages 16 and 18.” Rosen, supra note 18, at 297.
254. See Schmidt, supra note 116, at 49–50.
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ties255 and are more politically and socially aware than their
counterparts in the West. African children are also often entrusted with responsibilities that Western liberal culture may
consider as an abuse of their rights even though they are acceptable under certain cultural contexts.256 For example, children may assist “relatives on market stalls and in small family
businesses.”257 Street vending and running errands are also
common tasks given to children.258 Also, in this context, adolescence is defined as “a pre-adult phase.”259 Nonetheless, it must
be borne in mind that the danger to which children are exposed
as soldiers can hardly be “justified by arguments based on cultural and regional variations regarding the maturity of child
soldiers.”260
The approach adopted by international humanitarian law is
one that seems to align better with the views of contextualists
because it sets the age of childhood in relation to recruitment
and participation in hostilities at fifteen rather than eighteen
years of age. As the Commentary to Additional Protocol II explains, “[t]he moment at which a person ceases to be a child
and becomes an adult is not judged in the same way everywhere in the world. Depending on the culture, the age may
vary between about fifteen and eighteen years.”261 Aware of the
significant cross-cultural variation in the ages of childhood, the
drafters of Additional Protocol II could not agree to raise the
age of recruitment and participation to eighteen years of age
because national legislations were too divergent.262 Similarly,
the bulk of the discussions that took place during the negotiations of Additional Protocol I focused on cultural and regional

255. Farkhanda Zia-Mansoor, The Dilemma of Child Soldiers: Who is Responsible?, 16 KINGS C.L.J. 388, 389 (2005); see also Schmidt, supra note 116,
at 58.
256. See generally Chris A. Ike & Kwaku Twumasi-Ankrah, Child Abuse
and Child Labour Across Culture: Implications for Research, Prevention and
Policy Implementation, 14 J. SOC. DEV. AFR. 109 (1999).
257. Sylvia Chant & Gareth A. Jones, Youth, Gender and Livelihoods in
West Africa: Perspectives from Ghana and The Gambia, 3 CHILD.
GEOGRAPHIES 185, 190 (2005).
258. Id.
259. Stark, Boothby & Ager, supra note 6.
260. Breen, supra note 113, at 79.
261. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 4549.
262. Id. ¶ 4556.
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variations in relation to child soldiering.263 Consequently, the
age of fifteen was adopted as the lowest common denominator.
B. Autonomy
When a rights-based approach is adopted in relation to child
soldiers, one has to address the concept of autonomy upon
which the liberal human rights enterprise is founded. In a
modern world led by liberal thoughts, the individual is conceived as someone who has the capacity and autonomy to act.
The individual, who is viewed as independent and selfsufficient,264 is taken to be an essentially rational actor,265
someone who is able to contribute to a society266 that values his
or her capacity to act. Autonomy literally means living by one’s
own law; it is the ability to make certain decisions for oneself
without undue interference from others. According to liberal
thought, “[t]he individual is . . . attributed with knowledge of
his own best interests and the ability to pursue them rationally.”267
This discourse, however, is difficult to apply to children who
are viewed as not having fully developed autonomy even
though the UNCRC clearly spells out in its Article 12 that
“States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely
in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of
the child.”268 It is at this point where the liberal discourse
seems to contradict itself; on the one hand liberals wish chil-

263. See id. ¶ 3179 (noting that “[t]he age of puberty varies, depending on
climate, race and the individual,” thereby again taking into account the
broader context); Breen, supra note 113, at 79.
264. “Independence and self-sufficiency are set up as transcendent values,
attainable aspirations for all members of society.” Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and SelfSufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 17 (2000).
265. GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 37.
266. Marc-Henry Soulet, La vulnérabilité comme catégorie de l’action
publique [Vulnerability as a Category of State Intervention], 2 PENSÉE
PLURIELLE 49, 50–51 (2005).
267. GOODWIN, supra note 21, at 37.
268. UNCRC, supra note 22, art. 12(1).
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dren to enjoy their autonomy and their rights269 but on the other hand, they—probably influenced by a more humanitarian
discourse—regard children as innocent human beings whose
safety and rights should be protected and promoted and whose
needs must be adequately addressed.270 Liberals often view
children as victims, as vulnerable individuals who need to be
helped by adults as adults appear to know best what their interests are. As a result, the discourses of children as victims
and individuals as autonomous agents of their own fate clash.
As Alice Macdonald summarizes, “[t]he emergence of individual
agency threatens discourses of victimhood.”271 Yet, liberals
have tempered their claims of autonomy and rights to emphasize the protection of children and the principle of the best interests of the child as enshrined in Article 3(1) of the
UNCRC.272 This can be explained in the following manner:
Some liberals tend to believe that those “who reject [the liberal]
human-rights culture should change their ways” and that “this
culture is a morally superior way of life.”273 Thus, liberals wish
to extend their ideas on a universal level, and this means intervening and engaging in a discourse of the others borders on
paternalism.274 In their eyes, children are not autonomous in269. See Michael Freeman, Introduction: Rights, Ideology and Children, in
THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 3, 3 (Michael Freeman & Philip Veerman eds., 1992).
270. Alice Schmidt explains that “[l]iberal views, which dominate at least
the western, developed world, essentially see children as innocent, weak and
in need of protection rather than as agents of their own and significant contributors to social and political life.” Schmidt, supra note 116, at 57.
271. Alice Macdonald, ‘New Wars: Forgotten Warriors’: Why Have Girl
Fighters Been Excluded from Western Representations of Conflict in Sierra
Leone?, 33 AFR. DEV. 135, 142 (2008).
272. UNCRC, supra note 22, art. 3(1). Unfortunately the United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child has so far refused to provide a precise
definition of the term or to outline the common factors of the best interests of
the child. The term “best interests of the child” broadly describes the wellbeing of a child. Such well-being is determined by a variety of individual circumstances (e.g., age, level of maturity, presence or absence of parents,
his/her environment and experiences).
273. Mark Evans, Liberalisms, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT: A
READER AND GUIDE 113, 118 (Alan Finlayson ed., 2003).
274. As Goodwin explains, “the liberal desire to fuse political and human
rights suggests an element of moral imperialism . . . .” GOODWIN, supra note
21, at 337; see also Schmidt, supra note 116, at 59 (“It seems . . . that liberal
notions of childhood are applied at will by some or at least whenever it is
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dividuals, endowed with the ability to make decisions; on the
contrary, children are vulnerable individuals. There are several
reasons that explain this position.
First, a liberal approach tends to regard children as being
unable to make conscious and informed decisions, especially
when this concerns their participation in armed hostilities. After all, the Western society identifies childhood with innocence
and play. It is widely understood that children have a limited
capacity to understand the world. This inability plays against
the child in the liberal discourse inasmuch as he or she is
coaxed into recruitment and used in hostilities because he or
she is obedient, easy to manipulate, and lacks fear when engaged in battle.275 It is also easy to indoctrinate a child.276 It is
not difficult to convince a child to take part in hostilities without the child fully understanding the consequences of his or her
acts.277 Ethics, culture, and society are often used to legitimate
the use of child soldiers:278 defending one’s people and homeland from violent aggression or political oppression279 and being able to provide for one’s family.280 They are fighting for a
cause “that is portrayed as being in their political and economic
best interests.”281 But does this mean that children are not psychologically able to make informed decisions? At this juncture,
it must be underlined that whilst the international community
often shows young children taking part in the hostilities, “adoconvenient, for example, for the north to patronize the south.”); Pupavac, supra note 53, at 109.
275. See Sabine Collmer, Child Soldiers—An Integral Element in New, Irregular Wars?, 3 CONNECTIONS Q.J. 1, 8 (2004).
276. “Both advocacy literature and media accounts routinely refer to child
soldiers as having been ‘programmed,’ in the sense of being trained to function like robots or members of a cult.” Child Solder Recruitment, supra note
66, at 50.
277. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 94, ¶ 4555; see also de Silva, Hobbs &
Hanks, supra note 146, at 130–31.
278. As Michael Wessells explains “contextualists do not want to rule out
the acceptability of child soldiering under certain circumstances.” Michael
Wessells, How We Can Prevent Child Soldiering, 12 PEACE REV. 408 (2000).
279. “[C]hildren were not plucked from . . . a normal childhood to fight in a
conflict they neither wanted nor understood, but were compelled to fight to
preserve the lives of their families, community, and culture.” Jonasen, supra
note 42; Hughes, supra note 7, at 402; see also Abbott, supra note 60, at 517–
18.
280. See Davison, supra note 68, at 140; Hughes, supra note 7, at 403.
281. De Berry, supra note 2, at 98.
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lescents make up the vast majority of child soldiers worldwide .
. . .”282 Their understanding of the situation is undoubtedly different from the one of an eight year old.283 The conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia have demonstrated that this distinction
between younger and older children was even institutionalized
as the younger ones between nine and thirteen years old of age
were enrolled in the “Small Boy Units” while adolescents were
not classified as boys anymore but full-fledged soldiers,284 often
in charge of younger children.
Also, if children are not able to make informed decisions,
then one may ask how much children nowadays differ from
those who took part in past conflicts.285 One possible answer is
that whereas past conflicts could be easily understood as one
state fighting against another state, the “new wars” are incredibly difficult to understand, even for adults. The recruitment of
seventeen years old children in the British forces appears acceptable to the public as it appears that he will likely be
fighting in a conventional war. Further, Western society believes that this individual is deciding to take on a career in the
armed forces.286 Yet, a child of the same age engulfed and in-

282. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 54; Williams, supra note 128, at 1074. The
term “adolescents” describe young individuals undergoing “a transitional period during which a young person is no longer a ‘child’ in the commonly understood sense, but not yet an ‘adult’ although increasingly expected to take
on adult tasks and roles.” Brett, supra note 137, at 858 n.4.
283. See Hart, supra note 10, at 223–24.
284. Murphy, supra note 75, at 74.
285. As Mary Jonasen explains in relation to children in conflicts, “some
critics ask how contemporary child soldiering differs in the current context
from past comparisons.” Jonasen, supra note 42.
286. For example, see the UK’s position: “In order to compete in
an increasingly competitive employment market, the Services need to attract
young people aged 16 and above into pursuing careers in the armed forces. In
doing so, the armed forces provide valuable and constructive training and
employment to many young people, giving them a sense of great achievement
and worth, as well as benefiting society as a whole.” Committee
on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
under
Article
8,
Paragraph 1,
of
the Optional
Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 2007. United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/OPAC/GBR/1 (Sept. 3, 2007). That being said, Jason Hart argues that
“[a]ccording to emerging norms, 18, 19 and 20 year olds should be studying at
universities to lay the foundations for their future lives, not dying in a road-
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volved in a “new war” in another state raises eyebrows even
though, as Roger Rosenblatt argues, “[a] kid fighting with a
bunch of rebels is far more apt to know why he is doing it than
a recruit of a national guard.”287 Fighting in an armed group or
even in the armed forces of a non-liberal and democratic state
is perceived to be a judicious career path.288
Perhaps, at the very least, the liberal discourse seems to miss
the point that with age and experience, children are able to acquire the ability to understand the world and thus become active agents of their own lives. Indeed, “[a]lthough, in many areas of the world, people are deemed to be intellectually and emotionally mature at earlier ages, eighteen years of age appears
to be the most widely accepted point at which individuals are
no longer considered children.”289 For example, “[i]t is generally
accepted that from the age of 15 the development of a child’s
faculties is such that there is no longer the same need for special, systematic measures.”290 Therefore, international humanitarian law appears to be more in line with this reality than international human rights law, which sets eighteen years of age
as the end of childhood. In other words, international humanitarian law takes it that children beyond fifteen are capable of
autonomy.
Reverting to the issue of the “new wars” and bearing in mind
that it might indeed be difficult for children to understand the
intricacies of such conflicts, one can reasonably ask whether
international humanitarian law’s approach is appropriate. International humanitarian law is principally built on the idea of
traditional armed forces, and the bulk of the law pertains to
international armed conflicts and non-international conflicts
between armed forces and armed opposition groups.291 Is international humanitarian law, particularly its provisions on child
soldiers, outdated? It might be, but even though customary inside bomb incident in a theatre of war thousands of miles from home.” Hart,
supra note 10.
287. ROGER ROSENBLATT, CHILDREN OF WAR 101 (1983).
288. This position is redolent of earlier liberalism that believed that there
was a “family of civilized nations” that was allowed to teach other nations.
See EDWARD KEENE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THOUGHT: A HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION 170, 192 (2005).
289. Brosha, supra note 10.
290. Dutli, supra note 177, at 422.
291. See HARVEY, supra note 51, at 8.
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ternational humanitarian law covers additional types of conflicts, particularly non-international armed conflicts in which
two armed opposition groups fight against each other, it still
allows for the recruitment and use of children above fifteen
years of age.292 In fact, customary international humanitarian
law cannot be altered unless those taking part in the hostilities—both state and non-state actors—change their behavior or
practice and also consider that by doing so, they are bound by a
legal norm.293 As of now, there is no solid evidence that states
and armed opposition groups consider the recruitment and participation of children between fifteen and eighteen years of age
to be a violation of international humanitarian law.
A second reason why liberals have tempered their claims of
autonomy and rights and emphasized the protection of children
and the principle of the best interest of the child can be explained by the persistent and unceasing discourse of children
as victims and vulnerable individuals,294 especially within the
context of armed conflict.295 The mainstream liberal view is
that children cannot properly be considered perpetrators of violent acts and that their actions must be understood by looking
at the wider social context; “the neo-liberal approach often involves viewing children as passive victims that must be saved
through legal protections.”296 On the other hand, the reality is
much grimmer.
Indeed, many children are full participants in the armed conflict. Their participation ranges from helping out with cooking
or managing the camp to committing atrocities. In many of
these conflicts, after being forced to perform ritualistic killings,297 such as killing their family or their relatives,298 children are provided with some rudimentary training on how to

292. Additional Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 77; Additional Protocol II,
supra note 26, art. 4(3); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 91, at
482–85.
293. See Robert McCorquodale, An Inclusive International Legal System, 17
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 477, 498 (2004).
294. Hart, supra note 10, at 220.
295. See Schmidt, supra note 116, at 60.
296. Brosha, supra note 10.
297. Human Rights Watch, supra note 69, at 19, 27.
298. Aaron Young, Preventing, Demobilizing, Rehabilitating, and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in African Conflicts, 7 J. INT’L POL’Y SOLUTIONS 19, 20
(2007); see also Graf, supra note 136, at 952.
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operate weapons.299 They gradually enter a process of military
socialization that aims to transform them into killing machines, a practice that can be witnessed in various African
states.300 The Taylor judgment is replete of sad examples of
crimes committed by children.301 Generally, children who live
in such an environment tend to lose their personality and identity,302 as well as any connection to the real world.303 Furthermore, by living in such a violent world—where disorder and
arbitrariness are commonplace—they lose touch with any concepts of morality that may have been inculcated to them before
they joined the armed groups.304 Indeed “[c]hildren participating in hostilities are a deadly threat, not only to themselves,
but also to the persons whom their impassioned and immature
nature may lead them to shoot at.”305 African conflicts show
that many children, trapped in a world of sustained and orchestrated violence, turn into merciless killers,306 becoming

299. Breen, supra note 113, at 73. Regarding extensive training, see Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1598–99 (May 18,
2012).
300. Legrand & Weissman, supra note 104, at 2–3; see also Thompson, supra note 75, at 193; R.A. DALLAIRE ET AL., CHILDREN IN CONFLICT:
ERADICATING THE CHILD SOLDIER DOCTRINE 13 (2007); GABRIELA
MISCHKOWSKI, ABDUCTED, RAPED, ENSLAVED: THE SITUATION OF GIRL SOLDIERS
IN THE CASE OF UGANDA 4 (2005); Abbott, supra note 60, at 510; Prosecutor v.
Sesay (RUF Case), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1619–22, 1632,
1637
(Mar.
2,
2009),
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3D&tabid=215.
301. See, e.g., Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, ¶¶ 1462, 1565 (listing the
crimes perpetrated by the children).
302. Alcinda Honwana, Innocents et coupables: Les enfants-soldats comme
acteurs tactiques [Innocent and Guilty: Child-Soldiers as Tactical Actors], 80
POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 58, 67–68 (2000) [hereinafter Innocents et coupables],
(Fr.).
303. See Faulkner, supra note 79, at 495; see also Zia-Mansoor, supra note
255, at 397.
304. Maslen, supra note 223, at 25; see also LISA ALFREDSON, SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS: AN EXPLORATION AND ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS
AND
TRENDS
7
(2001),
available
at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C216BEBEEF8597E1C1
256DAB002D9450-csusc-exploit.pdf.
305. Dutli, supra note 177, at 421.
306. Maslen, supra note 223, at 24; see Faulkner, supra note 79, at 495;
Innocents et coupables, supra note 302, at 65.

2013]

"NEW WARS" OF/ON CHILDREN

1103

“horde[s] of insensate killers”307 that are still portrayed in the
liberal discourses as innocent individuals.308
Children should not only be seen as reluctant participants in
armed conflicts but also as active agents. It is imperative to
understand the reality on the ground in order to be in a position to fully appreciate the hurdles faced by those trying to set
new legal norms. The current international discourse decontextualizes child soldiers from the social, political, and economic
context that regulates their lives.309 One might question
whether children trapped in such a situation are still able to
genuinely consent to their participation in the conflict, or are
simply the means to an end for the armed group. It is reported
that child soldiers often feel empowered through their experiences of fighting,310 bearing arms,311 and killing.312 For some,
being in an armed group means enhanced opportunities, autonomy, and respect.313
At this stage, the concept of “agency” must be introduced. The
liberal discourse is uneasy with regard to the application of the
concept of “agency” to children, for its “focus on the rights of
autonomous actors does not . . . account for individuals—
307. Faulkner, supra note 79, at 499.
308.
Romeo Dallaire . . . recalled how one of his soldiers was faced with a
situation in Somalia during which he was fired upon by young children using AK-47s . . . . [T]he soldier in question experienced almost
unimaginable emotional and moral torment at the prospect of having
to return fire at ‘innocent’ children. Ultimately, however, the soldier
had to protect those around him, including a church full of villagers;
he fired back.
Brosha, supra note 10.
309. See Murphy, supra note 75, at 63. Murphy also argues that the question “‘[w]ho recruited, armed and commanded’ the children?” can be “asked in
a human rights framework, but it also should be asked in a social science
framework in order to stimulate inquiry into the institutional structures
through which these events are taking place.” Id. at 63–64.
310. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 63.
311. Possession of a weapon often “conferred a certain status” within the
group. R.A. DALLAIRE ET AL., supra note 300, at 13.
312. See AFUA TWUM-DANSO, AFRICA’S YOUNG SOLDIERS: THE CO-OPTION OF
CHILDHOOD
41
(2003),
available
at
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono82.pdf.
313. See Harry West, Girls with Guns: Narrating the Experience of War of
Frelimo’s “Female Detachment,” 73 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 180, 186–87 (2000).
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specifically children—whose autonomous identity is not yet fully formed.”314 Agency is a form of autonomy that focuses on the
capacity to conceive and act upon projects and values, including
those outside of one’s own experiences.315 Agency, as explained
by Alcinda Honwana, “concerns events of which an individual
is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any
phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently.
Whatever happened would not have happened if that individual had not intervened.”316 Thus, the agent must have transformative capacity—“the power to intervene or to refrain from
intervention.”317
Are children agents of their own lives, that is, do they have
the capacity to make informed choices? The simple answer
seems to be in the affirmative, at least to a large extent. For
example, “[i]n all conflicts, children can take, and some choose
to take, an active role in supporting violence. Children make
calculated decisions during armed conflict about how to access
shelter, food, medicine, and best ways to keep themselves and
their family members safe.”318 This shows that some children
do in fact manipulate situations in order to turn them into opportunities. Alcinda Honwana refers to “tactical agency,” “a
specific type of agency that is devised to cope with the concrete,
immediate conditions of their lives in order to maximize the
circumstances created by their military and violent environment.”319 Similarly, Schmidt contends that children, as actors
in a conflict, make rational choices based on the “[limited] in-

314. Neil S. Binder, Taking Relationships Seriously: Children, Autonomy
and the Right to a Relationship, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1150, 1150 (1994).
315. DAVID JOHNSTON, THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL THEORY: A CRITIQUE AND
RECONSTRUCTION 71, 75 (1994).
316. Alcinda Honwana, Innocent & Guilty: Child-Soldiers as Interstitial &
Tactical Agents, in MAKERS AND BREAKERS: CHILDREN & YOUTH IN
POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA 31, 48 (Alcinda Honwana & Filip De Boeck eds., 2005)
(quoting ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 9 (1984)).
317. Id. at 48.
318. See Expert Group Meeting of the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) in collaboration with UNICEF on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and Violence Against the Girl Child, Florence, It., Sept. 25–28, 2006, The Girl Child and Armed Conflict: Recognizing
and Addressing Grave Violations of Girls’ Human Rights, at 3, U.N. Doc.
EGM/DVGC/2006/EP.12 (Sept. 25–28, 2006) (by Dyan Mazurana & Khristopher Carlson).
319. Honwana, supra note 316, at 49.
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formation they possess and their [limited] ability to weigh one
choice against another . . . .”320
Notwithstanding this, it could also be argued that a child soldier’s actions are constrained by his or her weak position, and
that in reality, he or she is acting in relation to a specific event
rather than looking at the long-term consequences of his or her
actions.321 It might thus be argued that these children are indeed not autonomous. Furthermore, whilst children may exercise their agency, they do so without a moral compass and ethical guidance. To illustrate the point, it is worth noting that
some child soldiers attain positions of command in armed
groups and become leaders by actively participating in the hostilities and committing the worst atrocities (e.g., committing
murders, punishing and executing fellow child soldiers, pressganging other children into armed groups).322 The liberal approach to autonomy presupposes a conception of a morally autonomous agent.323 Again, this can hardly be applied to child
soldiers. Another factor that needs to be taken into account is
the age and maturity of a child. A child soldier can be a teenager as well as an eight-year-old. As such, in the context of child
soldiers, it is indeed a fine line between victimhood, autonomy,
and agency. The reality is thus more complex than the one portrayed in the liberal discourse.
CONCLUSION
Drawing again on the comparison between the African boy
soldier and Joan of Arc—the French heroine and Catholic
Saint—the phenomenon of child soldiering must be understood
in its historical context, bearing in mind the rise of the human
rights ideology that has led the world to look at child soldiering
through the prism of children’s rights rather than through international humanitarian law.
Children are shaped by their experiences but are “also
shaped by the nature of the childhood that they experience.”324
Liberals, however, seek to produce a social construction of
320. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 60.
321. Innocents et coupables, supra note 302, at 75–76.
322. TWUM-DANSO, supra note 312, at 29, 41.
323. See Gerald F. Gaus, The Place of Autonomy Within Liberalism, in
AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM 272–73 (John Christman &
Joel Rogers eds., 2005).
324. James & James, supra note 11, at 30.
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childhood that reinforces a social legal order in which adults
are autonomous individuals protecting the innocent child,325
who is endowed with a range of rights, the most significant of
these being that all actions should be taken for the child’s best
interests.326 This paternalistic stance ensures that children
who willingly take part in hostilities will be deemed to have
lost control of their possibly limited agency. In this view,
fighting is for adults only.
Broadly speaking, international law seeks to protect children
from becoming child soldiers. For instance, the recruitment,
conscription, enlistment, and use of children in armed conflict
are clearly prohibited, but at the same time, international law
acknowledges that children can be full participants in hostilities. The current trend in international law, however, is trying
to remove all children from the battlefield, thus revealing international law’s unwillingness to concede that children might
be able to make autonomous decisions; “[r]ecruitment, whether
enforced or voluntary, is always against the best interests of
the child.”327
That is not to say that child soldiering is a positive experience or that the fact that they volunteer can be used to justify
the appalling treatment that ensues. Whilst children should be
allowed to decide their involvement in hostilities on their own,
this choice needs to be informed and viable alternatives need to
be presented to such children. Experience shows that even
children who suffered terribly at the hands of the armed forces
often chose, once released or demobilized, to return to the mists
of war.328 Indeed, if they take part, whether directly or indirectly, in the hostilities, it is likely that once the conflict is over,
these children will be unable to be regarded “as active agents,
as productive people in society”329 even though it is proven that
“children’s agency [is] conducive to rehabilitation and dealing
with trauma and fear.”330 They will have “to play the part of
innocent victims” to benefit from international aid and the pro325. See Schmidt, supra note 116, at 57–58.
326. Freeman, supra note 269, at 5.
327. Coomaraswamy, supra note 140, at 542.
328. Williams, supra note 128, at 1083.
329. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Statement of Witness Elisabeth Schauer, at 33 (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662611.pdf.
330. Schmidt, supra note 116, at 61.
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grams set up in the framework of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes.331 If they fail to do so, the only other viable alternative is to return to what they know: war.
Therefore, “[f]undamental to any effort to address child recruitment is the acquisition of insight into the roles, responsibilities, and competencies of children themselves.”332 Without
understanding why children join or become participants in
armed conflicts, the international campaign to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers is bound to fail. To ensure that fewer
children take part in conflicts, a whole range of measures—
“preventive, suppressive, educational and rehabilitative in nature”333—must be enacted. More crucially, these measures
must be designed under the influence of what children have to
say so as to give them a voice in the debate on the recruitment
and participation of children in armed conflict.

331. See McKnight, supra note 54, at 127–28.
332. Hart, supra note 10, at 224; see also Schmidt, supra note 116, at 65.
333. Guiding Principles, supra note 86, at 5.

